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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we investigate a university network that uses Active Directory
as its authentication system. We get an understanding of the network by ana-
lyzing Windows event logs generated at Active Directory domain controllers.
We want to see what network activity looks like as a first step in identifying
and modeling network lateral movement. We characterize network activity,
access behavior, most frequent events encountered, and domain controller
usage. We find that the data, covering a week’s time, supports multiple
trends. The number of events encountered increases from morning to noon
and decreases after mid-afternoon. Weekend activity is lower than during
weekdays. Over the week of user-generated events, about 85% create 1,000
events or less. Less than 5% of users create more than 10,000 events. The top
five events encountered are associated with user sessions (i.e., login, logout,
authentication) or Kerberos ticket requests. Most events are generated at the
Urbana Domain Controllers. The second largest number of events (although
about 15 times smaller) are generated at the DCs that serve only WiFi and
VPN.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
For many sophisticated cyber attacks, breaching a network is only the first
step. Post-exploitation, an attacker may want to expand control to other net-
work resources [1, 2, 3]. In order to locate a target system and accomplish
its goal, an attacker relies on moving around in a network, undetected, until
the target is found. An adversary cannot always carry out a sophisticated
attack by directly compromising the target system. An attacker must in-
stead compromise one system on the network that is vulnerable, learn about
the breached network, look for vulnerabilites on other systems, and find and
compromise the target [4, 5, 6]. Trend Micro [5] organizes these network
attacks into 6 stages: Intelligence Gathering, Point of Entry, Command and
Control Communication, Lateral Movement, Maintenance, and Data Exfil-
tration. There is some overlap between the stages, and some stages might
involve repeating previous stages. In this thesis, we look specifically at the
threat of lateral movement. According to [5], the three goals of lateral move-
ment are:
1. obtain escalated privileges within the target network,
2. learn about the target network through observation, and
3. gain access to other machines within the network.
We focus our attention on the latter two goals.
For a defender, it is crucial to minimize and detect these types of attacks.
It can be difficult, however, to know if a stealthy adversary is moving around
in the network. One way for a defender to gain an advantage is by thoroughly
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knowing the network he is protecting. This becomes problematic when the
network has thousands or hundreds of thousands of nodes.
One approach is to actively monitor the network. The defender can build
a base-line for what would be considered normal behavior, and continue
to monitor for anomalies. If network activity deviates from expected, the
defender can investigate the cause of the alarm.
In order to study lateral movement, we want to first understand normal
user movement. In this thesis, we investigate a university network that uses
Active Directory as its authentication system. We get an understanding of
the network by analyzing user logins, logouts, usage patterns, and how Ker-
beros tickets are distributed. We investigate event logs produced at Active
Directory controllers to identify behavior. The behaviors we are interested
in include access patterns and usage distributions.
1.1.1 Active Directory
Active Directory (AD) is a Microsoft service for managing Windows domain
networks. Active Directory centralizes user and resource management. Net-
work administrators can add and modify information about users and groups,
computers and printers, and applications and services efficiently from the cen-
tral repository. This information can then be distributed and made available
for the network [7]. Network admins can allow a user to access resources with-
out individually configuring each resource. For example, a user is allowed to
log into any computer in a computer lab, and the admin does not have to
create a local account for the user at each computer. An Active Directory
Domain Services (AD DS) server is also called a domain controller. It is
the entity that authenticates and authorizes the users and computers on the
network, as well as enforcing their access policies. AD supports multiple pro-
tocols: DNS, Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), and Kerberos.
LDAP is used primarily for internal AD processes such as clients download-
ing schemas and retrieving policies. Kerberos is a protocol for secure user
authentication, even on an insecure network [8, 9].
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1.1.2 Active Directory Authentication
Windows NT LAN Manager (NTLM) and Kerberos protocols can be used to
authenticate a user in Active Directory. Kerberos is the preferred method,
but cannot always be used. Kerberos cannot be used if a domain is running
Windows NT 4.0 or older, if the client is using an IP address to connect to
an AD service rather than a host name, if the client is accessing a resource
that is not a member of the AD domain, or if the resource does not support
the Kerberos protocol [10].
1.1.3 NTLM
NTLM is a challenge-response protocol for authenticating a user and a com-
puter. The NTLM protocol involves the use of LAN Manager (LM) hashes
and Windows NT (NT) hashes. Details about these hashes are explored
in [10, 11]. NTLM can be used to authenticate a local user account on a
computer or a domain account on a domain (such as through Active Direc-
tory) [12]. As of the release of Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2,
session security policy is set to require a 128-bit minimum encryption for
clients and servers [13]. Older versions of NTLM use 40-bit and 56-bit keys.
There are two versions of the protocol: interactive and noninteractive.
Interactive is used when the user wants to authenticate with a computer.
Noninteractive is when the user is already logged into the computer and wants
to access a resource. The following describes the “three-way handshake” for
the NTLM authentication protocol [14, 10, 15].
1. This step is exclusive to interactive authentication. The client wants
to access a computer. The client provides a domain name, username,
and password to a client computer. The password is hashed and the
original password is discarded.
2. The client requests a challenge from the authentication server, provid-
ing his username in plaintext.
3. The server creates a 16-byte random number to use as the challenge.
This challenge is sent to the client.
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4. The client receives the challenge and computes a response. The random
number is encrypted with the hashed password. The client sends the
response to the server.
5. The server receives the client’s challenge response. It then forwards
this response, the original challenge, and the username to the domain
controller (DC).
6. The domain controller has a database of usernames and password hashes.
The DC looks up the user’s stored hash and encrypts the challenge with
this hash. It then compares its result to the response that the user com-
puted. If they are the same, the user is successfully authenticated.
1.1.4 Kerberos
The Kerberos protocol for authentication involves three parties: a client, a
server (resource), and an authentication server called the Key Distribution
Center (KDC).
Kerberos relies on long-term and short-term cryptographic keys for en-
cryption and decryption. Long-term keys are used for verifying user, system,
and service identities. These keys are derived from passwords. When a user
account is created in Active Directory, a key, derived from their password, is
stored in a KDC database. When the user wants to log in, they supply their
password and the user key is created [9]. Short-term keys are used for com-
munication in which the session is not expected to last as long. As we will see
later, session keys that are used for temporary client-service communication
are short-term keys.
The KDC’s role is also to avoid each user needing to maintain keys for
each server, and for each server to maintain keys for each user. What follows
is the protocol for how a user obtains access to a network resource using
Kerberos version 5 [9]. This is also illustrated in Figure 1.1. Note that the
TGS is illustrated as running on the KDC, but this is not a requirement.
1. When the user wants to access a service, such as a network printer, the
user requests permission from the KDC to access the Ticket-Granting-
Server (TGS). When Kerberos Preauthentication is enabled, the user
sends his username and a timestamp encrypted with his own encryption
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Figure 1.1: Kerberos Protocol
key, the long-term key, as evidence of his identity [8]. The Kerberos
server looks up the client in its database (only checks if the client
exists). The KDC also has a copy of the user’s key in its database,
which it uses to decrypt the timestamp to verify the user’s identity.
If Preauthentication fails or is disabled, an alternative, similar step
takes place instead. The user first sends a request to the KDC that
initiates the authentication process. To confirm the user’s identity, the
KDC responds to the user with a message encrypted with the user’s
private key, which the KDC has on record. Only the user’s key can
decrypt this message. By decrypting this message and continuing with
the protocol, the KDC confirms the user owns his key, confirming his
identity. This completes the authentication step. The KDC also iden-
tifies if the user is authorized to use the requested resource through
permission policies.
2. A session key (SK1) is generated for use between the client and the
TGS. The Kerberos server responds to the client with two messages.
One message contains information about the TGS, a timestamp, a
ticket lifetime, and SK1, and is encrypted with the clients private key.
The second message is the TGT and contains the clients information,
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timestamp, network information, TGT lifetime, and SK1. The TGT is
encrypted with the TGS private key, which the client does not know.
The user must provide this TGT whenever he wants to request, from
the TGS, access to other network resources.
3. The client decrypts the message and recovers SK1. The client now
builds two messages to send to the TGS. It first builds a data structure
called the Authenticator, containing the clients information and times-
tamp. The first message contains unencrypted request information (the
desired resource) and requested lifetime of the ticket. The second mes-
sage contains the Authenticator, encrypted with KS1, and TGT, still
encrypted with the TGS private key (from the Kerberos authentication
server). The TGT is used to request service tickets (for services such
as Microsoft Exchange, network drives, or network printers [16]) from
the TGS. These two messages are sent to the TGS.
4. The TGS does a KDC database lookup to make sure the requested
service exists. The TGS uses its own private key to decrypt the TGT.
The TGT contains SK1, so the TGS now uses SK1 to decrypt the
Authenticator. Information from the Authenticator is validated with
the TGT. The TGS then generates a session key (SK2) for the client
and the resource to use. It sends two messages to the client: the first
contains SK2 and client information, and is encrypted with SK1. The
second is a resource service ticket that contains the clients information,
network information, timestamp, lifetime, and SK2, which is encrypted
with the resources private key. A service ticket is good only for the
particular service that was requested by the user. Whenever the user
wants to access the service for which the ticket is specified, the user
must provide this service ticket.
5. The client decrypts the client message with SK1 to obtain SK2. The
client is now ready to talk to the resource. It sends two messages: the
first is another Authenticator that contains the clients information and
timestamp, encrypted with SK2. The second message is the resource
service ticket obtained from the TGS (still encrypted with the resource
private key).
6. The resource essentially repeats the steps that the TGS performed. It
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decrypts the resource service ticket with its own private key to obtain
SK2. It uses SK2 to decrypt the Authenticator and validate the user’s
information. The service can use the contents of the decrypted service
ticket to confirm the user named in the ticket matches the user trying
to use the ticket. The client is now authenticated to use the resource.
7. The following steps are optional for Kerberos. The resource then sends
its own Authenticator message to the client to confirm its identity,
encrypted with SK2.
8. The client receives the resource’s Authenticator message, decrypts with
SK2, and can confirm that the resource is the intended resource. The
client now confirmed the identity of the service.
To summarize, the user password hash/key is used to obtain a TGT, a
TGT is used to obtain service tickets, and service tickets are used to gain
access to services.
The client caches the TGT and any resource tickets. TGTs and service
tickets have a default lifetime of 10 hours [8, 17, 18]. The client can then
check its cache for resource credentials (and if not found or expired, the TGT)
before going through the whole Kerberos protocol. From the perspective of
the client, the TGT is essentially just another ticket that allows access to
a resource. From the KDCs perspective, the TGT is a way to reduce the
number of ticket requests, and therefore reduce network communication and
processing.
1.2 Lateral Movement
Imagine a situation in which an attacker has gained access to one computer
on a network through some vulnerability (e.g., code injection attack) or user
error (e.g., malicious e-mail attachment). If the attacker wants to expand
his access, he may wish to gain access to other computers or resources in the
network. This is also known as network lateral movement. For example, the
attacker may be able to compromise a local account on a regular workstation.
That account might not have gone through the Kerberos protocol and gained
access to certain resources (i.e., possessing service tickets). Alternatively, the
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attacker may want to log into a particular resource using a particular account
(e.g., access a network folder as the user Dan Smith). There are multiple
attacks that can be performed to move laterally in a network.
What is the motivation for lateral movement? According to the works
of many security companies [4, 6, 19], lateral movement is useful to an
adversary for many reasons. They can gather information about a network
or systems on the network, gain access to specific files or credentials, and
even execute code on target systems. Lateral movement is an important step
for an adversary that has a specific long-term goal or a target that is hard-
to-reach from an outside network. Such an adversary could be an advanced
persistent threat (APT). An APT with sufficient resources and motivation
would be willing to infiltrate a network and move laterally until the desired
target system is found.
1.3 Attacks on Active Directory
1.3.1 Identity Snowball Attacks
Identity snowball attacks are a category of attacks that describe network lat-
eral movement. While not specific to Kerberos, an identity snowball attack,
as detailed in [20], is described as follows. An attacker leverages a user’s cre-
dentials to gain access to another resource, and the obtained resource allows
access to another resource, and those resources allow access to another re-
source, and so on. The first user’s credentials are obtained at a compromised
machine. The credentials obtained are at an elevated level such that access
to other resources is possible. For example, user Alice is a network admin-
istrator. Alice’s machine is compromised and her credentials are obtained
by an adversary. The adversary can now access Bob’s machine using Alice’s
credentials. Now Bob’s credentials are compromised by the adversary and
can be used to log into Carol’s machine. This repeats, and the adversary is
therefore moving laterally in the network.
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1.3.2 Pass the Hash Attack
User passwords are stored as a hash or a key, as described previously, and
kept in memory. This is to avoid the need to continually prompt the user for
a password on each Active Directory transmission, also called Single Sign-On
(SSO). The user can log in once using his password, and this information will
be kept in memory for a while without the user needing to reenter the pass-
word. The hashes in memory serve the same purpose as a password. From
an attacker’s perspective, obtaining a hash is nearly as good as obtaining a
plain text password. This is because a hash can be used to authenticate a
user, just like a password.
In a “pass-the-hash” attack, the attacker obtains a user’s password hash
and impersonates the user. If a user’s machine is compromised, the attacker
can read the user hash from memory. The hash can be obtained from the
Windows Local Security Authority (LSA) service. The LSA service han-
dles password hashes (such as NTLM hashes stored in the Security Accounts
Manager (SAM) and Kerberos hashes and tickets stored in a directory ser-
vices database). With administrative privilege, memory can be dumped from
these regions [21].
The attacker can store the retrieved hash in his own LSA, pretending to
be the user. The attacker can now follow the NTLM or Kerberos protocols
like normal. A TGT can be requested from the KDC, and service tickets can
be retrieved from the obtained TGT.
“Pass-the-hash” refers to using a recovered LM or NTLM hash, and “overpass-
the-hash,” also called “pass-the-key,” refers to using a recovered AES or RC4
key, but the concept of the attack is the same in either case. The user’s cre-
dentials are stolen and used to follow the Kerberos protocol to obtain a TGT
and possibly service tickets.
1.3.3 Pass the Ticket Attack
A ticket, whether crafted or obtained from memory, can be injected into the
current session. This means that the ticket is submitted to the TGS or to
the service in order to obtain access to the desired service. This behavior
is permitted and a Windows API call is available to perform this ticket
injection [22].
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The attacker can craft their own Kerberos tickets if the AD controller
or service is compromised. The attacker can use the stolen hash to create a
TGT. To craft a TGT, the hash would need to be obtained from the Kerberos
service account (krbtgt), which can be obtained from the LSA of the domain
controller. Alternatively (or in addition), the attacker could craft a service
ticket. To do this, the hash would need to be obtained from the service
account. Compromising the AD controller would be a best-case scenario for
the attacker, as private keys of user accounts and services would be accessible.
In this study, we focus our attention on what an attacker looks at in a network
prior to compromising an AD controller. We look at leaf nodes of a network,
which are workstations and services.
User Kerberos tickets (TGT and service tickets) are stored in memory.
This is to avoid continually going through the Kerberos protocol for every
request to use a network service. With administrative privilege, these tickets
can be read from memory. The attacker can inject an obtained ticket into
the current session. This means taking the recovered TGT or service ticket
and inserting it into the LSA (i.e., on a different computer). The attacker
needs to know the username associated with the injected ticket, as well. This
injection is done through a Windows API and does not require admin rights.
If the TGT is injected, the attacker can then request service tickets using the
TGT.
1.4 Research Questions
A future goal is to build models of how an attacker would move laterally in
the network. Before we can understand how an attacker can behave on the
network, we want to first understand how normal users behave. We want to
see what normal looks like on the network.
Active Directory controllers, TGSs, and Kerberos services log events and
network transactions. These logs are sent to an aggregation point where
they can be collected, stored, and later analyzed. We will analyze the logs
from Active Directory controllers that service network requests throughout
the entire university campus. Objectives of this research include:
1. Identify the number of unique users, recurrence of users, frequency of
users (frequency of logins)
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2. Characterize usage over time and where requests are served
3. Discover the number of TGTs and service tickets available
This research is significant because it provides security researchers a better
understanding of network usage on a university campus. University IT at
this campus can directly use this information to identify and investigate
anomolies or unexpected behavior we might find. Security researchers can
use the information provided to better understand large networks, including
usage patterns and frequency of events.
One of the goals of this work is to use the log data to better understand
the network. As a network defender, visualizing the log data is one way to
better understand network behavior and see patterns. A manager at the
Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center claims that defenders are at a security
disadvantage when they think of the network as a list rather than a graph
[23]. Having a list of systems to secure is useful, but it is also useful to
know how the systems are actively being used. It is easier to detect obvious
outliers if normal is well known. More detailed usage patterns are useful for
detecting more subtle lateral movement. We hope to provide these insights
throughout this thesis.
The described threats directly impact organizations, corporations, univer-
sities, and other entities that use internal networks running directory services.
1.5 Contributions
We analyzed Windows event logs produced at a university campus consisting
of over 44,000 students and an additional 5,000 faculty and staff [24]. This is
one of the largest studies we have seen in terms of user population [25, 26, 27].
The logs were over a week of network activity.
We characterized the activity we saw from users, services, and shares. We
described usage over a week, detailed usage based on event codes encountered,
looked at daily average usage, and discussed distribution across the domain
controllers. We repeat the previous analysis with the filtered data to gain
additional insight on network behavior without services and shares. We
provide additional insight to the university IT, Technology Services, about
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the network usage, such as points of unusually high traffic and authentication
failures.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Machine Learning Detection
The author of [28] uses the network analyzer BRO to detect lateral movement
in a network. This work focuses on the Server Message Block (SMB) pro-
tocol, although one segment of the work focuses on detecting pass the hash
attacks. He uses machine learning to identify what normal and abnormal
behavior looks like, so that anomalies can be detected which could indicate
an attacker attempting to move laterally in a network. This work does not
cover the Kerberos protocol and therefore is lacking detection for pass the
ticket attacks. Further, the approach implements policies to protect against
these behaviors. This black-list approach is limited by how many attacks
and behaviors the defenders can think of. Results from a corporate network
dataset indicate that this identification is plausible with relatively low false
positives (one per hour).
DExtor [29] is a data mining network analyzer that focuses solely on de-
tecting code. It runs under the assumption that only data is transferred on
a network and code is malicious. They use machine learning to differentiate
data and code, and place the detector on a live network. DExtor works at the
application layer, which is also where Kerberos resides. Their tests indicate
high accuracy for detecting code in network traffic and low false positives. It
is uncertain if their approach can be performed in real-time. Unfortunately,
an attacker wishing to move laterally in a network using Kerberos will con-
tinue to correctly follow the Kerberos protocol. The packets transferred will
only contain data.
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2.2 Analysis Tools
APT-Hunter [30], on the other hand, helps security analysts detect legiti-
mate logins that are carried out by an adversary. APT-Hunter is a visual-
ization tool that analysts can use to identify lateral movement in the form
of legitimate-looking logins. It helps visualize links and login patterns that
are suspicious, such as desktop-to-desktop connections. In their study, two
analysts used APT-Hunter to identify 349 out of 749 total malicious logins
(done from a red team) with a false positive rate of 0.005%. This analysis
was done oﬄine, so the practicality of APT-Hunter in real-time is uncertain.
Further, while the study demonstrates some success, about 53% of malicious
logins were missed. With a large enterprise network, manual evaluation is
time and resource intensive.
The authors of [31] use reachability graphs to quantify the risk for threats
on a network. They calculate a metric as the likelihood that a graph node is
reachable from another graph node. Pass the hash is one example of threats
they say can potentially be predicted. They evaluate only the performance of
this system, so the practicality and accuracy of detection is unknown. This
strategy may be too simple by only identifying what nodes are at higher risk
based on how many other nodes it connects to. This assumption might not
hold true in enterprise networks when an adversary is more likely to target
client workstations rather than high-traffic servers.
The authors of [20] created a tool to help network administrators defend
their networks. Heat-ray combines machine learning, combinatorial optimiza-
tion, and attack graphs to help IT make decisions on how to manage their net-
work. They focus on minimizing identity snowball attacks. Heat-ray suggests
configurations that eliminate unnecessary network links, reviews the number
of users with escalated privileges, removes out-of-date privileges, removes
group privilege assignments that are no longer needed or over-encompassing,
prevents high-privilege accounts from unnecessary logins, and secures auto-
mated script execution. It attempts to do all this while not preventing users
from accomplishing their tasks. Their evaluation demonstrates that using
Heat-ray to help configure a network reduces the number of identity snow-
ball attacks by 96%. This is a measure of the number of machines (out of
1,000) that are reachable and can be compromised before applying Heat-ray
and after multiple iterations of Heat-ray.
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2.3 Mobility
The authors of [32] examine user movement with cell phone records. They
suggest that user predictability follows a fat-tailed distribution. This means
that users that travel less should be easier to predict and those that travel
farther are less predictable. Said differently, the entropy is higher for those
that regularly travel farther. They also point out that there is a threshold
(they find to be 10 km) in which all users after this point are about equally
predictable, although less predictable than lower distances. They indicate
that there is a potential 93% average predictability in user mobility. They
do not find any factors such as demographic, age, gender, or even weekend
to weekday comparisons to be factors in predictability.
The authors of [33] look at wireless access point data gathered during an
ACM conference. They have data from four APs located in each corner of an
auditorium. They are able to correlate data with the events of the conference
schedule. With respect to user mobility, they determine the number of access
points visited and the number of access point handoffs that occur. They
notice fewer APs visited on the half day of events when compared to the
days that had full schedules, indicating less user roaming. The number of
AP handoffs over time also indicates points throughout the day when users
were not moving and started moving, which they correlated with breaks
between conference talks.
Others have done characterization of larger wireless networks. [25] looks
at 476 access points spread across 161 buildings, but only identifies 1706
unique wireless users (unique MAC addresses). They gather data using sys-
log, SNMP polling, and tcpdump. In 2008, the “largest WLAN study to
date” [27] examined 7000 users across 550 access points. This study also uses
syslog, SNMP polling, and tcpdump captures, as well as telephone (VoIP)
records. They obtain 32,747,757 syslog messages, 16,868,747 SNMP polls,
and 4.6 TB of sniffed traffic.
Most of the prior work that uses wireless access point traffic either needs
data that must be gathered on demand for desired experiments (additional
logging software, hardware, sniffers, etc.) or configuring access points to
save copies of packet traffic. Network packets are less descriptive than event
logs at an application level, although may contain other useful lower level
information. For example, we might not be able to tell that the packet is a
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TGT request, but we can instead know the client IP/MAC addresses, access
point IP/MAC addresses, and signal-to-noise ratio.
We also notice that results seem in conflict across different research studies.
[27] and [26], for example, see much different mobility patterns. Henderson
et al. see most of the users spending a vast majority of time staying at
the same access point, while Balazinska and Castro see more mobile users.
Interestingly, the campus environment was observed to have less mobile users
compared to the corporate environment. Mobility patterns are likely to vary
for differing campuses ( e.g., business vs. college) but past work indicates
the patterns may not be obvious or intuitive.
We investigate an alternative approach that takes advantage of existing
logging architecture. Windows event logs are generated at Active Directory
controllers when users request Kerberos TGTs, request Kerberos service tick-
ets, or log into wireless access points, among other triggers. This is a common
procedure for IT departments for security purposes. These logs are already
being gathered for the purpose of security auditing, so we attempt to reuse
them to answer mobility questions.
Across mobility papers, we find that the common areas of interest are:
1. Number of users/connections over time
2. Average number of users at an access point over time
3. Amount of data transferred
We are not working directly with access point logs or packet captures,
unlike these papers. We must translate these important considerations into
the paradigm we are working with:
1. Number of users/connections over time
2. Average number of users at a domain controller over time
3. What events were logged and how many of each event
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT
3.1 Proposal
Imagine a situation exists in which an attacker has gained access to one com-
puter on a network through some vulnerability (e.g., code injection attack)
or user error (e.g., malicious e-mail attachment). If the attacker wants to
expand his access, he may wish to gain access to other computers or re-
sources in the network. This is also known as network lateral movement. For
example, the attacker may be able to compromise a local account on a reg-
ular workstation. That account might not have gone through the Kerberos
protocol and gained access to certain resources (i.e., possessing service tick-
ets). Alternatively, the attacker may want to log into a particular resource
using a particular account (e.g., access a network folder as the user “Dan
Smith”). There are multiple attacks that can be performed to move laterally
in a network.
We are building models of user behavior on a campus network. Before we
can model lateral movement in the context of what an attacker is capable of,
we first look at what we should expect from regular movement.
Active Directory controllers, TGSs, and Kerberos services all log network
events. These logs are sent to an aggregation point where they can be col-
lected, stored, and later analyzed. In this study, we look at event logs gen-
erated from Active Directory controllers. In the future, we want to also look
at TGS and Kerberos service logs.
3.1.1 Collaboration
We collaborated with Technology Services at the University of Illinois Urbana-
Champaign to obtain Active Directory data logs. Technology Services ad-
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ministers Active Directory domain controllers and some services that use
Kerberos authentication.
3.1.2 Institutional Review Board
This study involved collecting data of human subjects, so it was our obliga-
tion to take every necessary precaution to ensure subject privacy and ethical
data collection. We submitted a New Protocol Application to the University
Institutional Review Board (IRB). This “Application for Review of Research
Involving Human Subjects” described the study in detail and outlined the
precautions we took to ensure responsible and ethical collection, handling,
and storage of user data. These precautions are described next.
3.2 Ethics
3.2.1 Privacy Safeguards
Logs gathered contain account names (NetID), host names, client computer
names, client network addresses, Kerberos session information (event codes,
error codes, encryption type), and timestamps.
Usernames, client computer names, and potentially client network ad-
dresses are user-identifying information and were anonymized. These fields
were replaced with a number chosen from the space of all numbers such that
for each username, its corresponding random number will always be the same.
Additionally, we could not map any corresponding random number back to
its original data without a key that is held solely by Technology Services. To
be more specific, we used a keyed hash algorithm that is constructed from
the 256-bit Secure Hash Algorithm (HMAC-SHA256) [34]. In other words,
username data is unique so that we can differentiate between users, but it is
not possible to identify a username based on a hashed username. Further, we
did not circumvent these protections by attempting to re-identify the users.
The key is held by Technology Services, meaning we did not have the ability
to de-anonymize users.
The anonymized data was periodically uploaded to an aggregation point.
The aggregation point is a Technology Services-administered shared Box di-
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rectory. Box is a service for sharing files, and is approved by the university
of storage of FERPA sensitive data [35]. This was where all the logs were
collected and combined. We then synchronized data from the shared Box di-
rectory with our Network and Security Research Group (NSRG) server. The
data transfer took place over HTTPS. This provided an encrypted, secure
channel of communication for the anonymized data. The NSRG server did
not communicate with the workstations, AD controllers, or services.
The NSRG server is located in the Advanced Computation Building (ACB).
Data resides on a Virtualized Machine running on the server. Data handling
risks were severely curtailed through the use of best practices in securing the
collection infrastructure and processing machines. These include, but are
not limited to: locked office, restricted access, restrictions on copying study-
related materials, access rights terminated when authorized users leave the
project or unit, individual ID plus password protection, encryption of digital
data, network restrictions, no non-UM devices used to access project data,
security software (firewall, anti-virus, anti-intrusion) installed and regularly
updated on all servers, workstations, laptops, and other devices used in the
project. All data storage and processing occurred on the NSRG server, and
the anonymized data did not leave the server, except in aggregated form for
research presentation.
The participants accessed Technology Services-administered computers and
performed their intended tasks as normal. This includes, but is not limited to,
working on homework, writing papers, programming, using network printers,
checking personal and university emails, web browsing, and playing games.
We did not interfere with participants’ computer usage and our data gather-
ing was transparent to the user. This is identical to how Technology Services
currently gathers data about user activities for network security purposes.
3.2.2 Risk Analysis
We believe the users would experience minimal distress if they discovered that
their usage was monitored. We believe this because Technology Services-
administered computers are identified as systems that are being actively
monitored for analytics and security purposes. The collection process was
transparent to the users and did not cause undue stress on their computing
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needs.
We believed the risks involved were minimal. The data gathered was
anonymized and stored on a secure NSRG server. If it were to be leaked,
individuals and personal information would not be revealed. We did not ex-
pect participants to feel any additional psychological stress that they would
not otherwise undergo from standard IT data logging.
We believed that the potential benefits of this research were significant.
We were able to quantify the opportunities an attacker has while attempting
to move laterally in a network. This was determined by identifying how many
resources an attacker would have available that can be used to gain access
to additional network resources. It provides cyber security researchers and
Information Technology personnel with insight on how attackers can navigate
a compromised network and what network resources can be targeted. These
insights could help in threat mitigation, recovering from compromises, and
identifying if an attacker is moving around in an internal network. These
threats directly impact organizations, corporations, universities, and other
entities that use internal networks.
3.2.3 Log Contents
We needed to know the exact contents of the logs we would be analyzing. We
also needed to determine which fields in the log contained revealing informa-
tion that must be anonymized. We received a sample log from Technology
Services. This log contained information from only our NSRG lab volunteers.
Details about the log content, including descriptions of each field and event
code translations, can be found in Appendix A.
3.3 Process
3.3.1 Data Gathering Process
Data was collected from Technology Services Active Directory (AD) con-
trollers and workstations. Data collection tools (i.e., AD service logging) are
running on the AD controllers and workstations that collect data and store
them in logs. Details about all the log fields are provided in Table A.1.
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Usernames, client computer names, and potentially client network addresses
are user-identifying information and were anonymized by being replaced with
an HMAC-SHA256 hash [34]. To reiterate, username data was unique so
that we can differentiate between users, but it was not possible to identify a
username based on a hashed username.
The anonymized data was periodically uploaded to the NSRG server through
the process previously described. The data was uploaded to a shared Box
directory, and downloaded from Box to the NSRG server.
3.3.2 Anonymization Pre-Processing
The logs generated will contain sensitive information, which means that
anonymization must take place before we receive the data. Anonymization
must occur at a Technology Services computer prior to being transmitted
to the NSRG server. We took this into consideration when developing the
anonymization technique. We wanted to minimize inconvenience and man-
ual labor, and maximize the data acquired. We wrote scripts to anonymize
sensitive fields, which would be used in an automated process. This reduces
inconvenience and manual labor. We also wanted to minimize inconvenience
by not imposing any unrealistic requirements on Technology Services to run
our script.
The script reads in the CSV log, anonymizes sensitive fields, and saves the
result. As mentioned previously, the fields we consider sensitive are those
that contain information that could be considered identifying. In these logs,
we anonymize fields that contain NetIDs, IP addresses, and device names.
Fields that contain only a NetID or IP address, such as “Account Name,”
“Logon Account,” and “Client Address,” are anonymized using the HMAC-
SHA256 keyed hash function. We anonymize the field “Source Workstation”
more tactically. This field may contain information about the source de-
vice that generated the log, such as a MacBook Pro or iPhone. It also
may contain identifying information about the owner of the device. For ex-
ample, our sample logs contained the entry “Zanes-MacBook-Pro-2.local”
which identifies one of our volunteer’s devices but also his first name. We
used the sample logs to identify patterns to look for when parsing the logs.
In the anonymization script, we used regular expressions (regex) to match
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these patterns. When a pattern was matched, we stripped any information
that could be considered sensitive and left only the pattern. For example,
“Zanes-MacBook-Pro-2.local” would become “MacBook-Pro.” This removes
user privacy concerns, but allows us to gather statistics about what devices
are used on the network. We took the safest approach if a pattern was not
matched. If we could not identify the contents of the Source Workstation
field, we HMAC-SHA256 hashed the entire field. We chose to do this to
ensure no sensitive information would be revealed in the case that we en-
counter a device that we did not account for. This field is also self-reporting,
according to Technology Services. Therefore, we were conservative with this
field because it could contain anything the computer or user chose to label
itself as.
Our first attempt used PowerShell 5.1. We chose PowerShell because it
is installed on Windows computers by default, which is what Technology
Services uses. Therefore, no additional installations or setup were necessary.
We discovered, however, that PowerShell was not practical for pre-processing
data fast enough or at the scale we were working with. In a test environment
using a 700 MB log sample, the PowerShell script took 1 minute 53 seconds to
read the file into memory, 1 minute 35 seconds to perform anonymization, and
55 seconds to write the final data to disk. The script memory consumption
was also not practical for data logs of the size we expected. PowerShell used
approximately 10 GB of RAM to import the 700 MB log file into memory.
We speculated the memory usage was much more than the size of the file
because the PowerShell “import-csv” command-let generates a dictionary-
like data structure. We predict PowerShell uses a substantial amount of
memory for CSV metadata. This was with a 700 MB file, but the practical
performance would be worse than this because the actual logs were many
gigabytes in size.
We gave the PowerShell script to Technology Services to test performance
and verify functionality. They ran the script on two log samples. The first was
a sample over a 5-minute period and was about 118 MB. The anonymization
script completed in about 4 minutes 22 seconds. The read, anonymize, and
write functionality was timed, as well. Importing the CSV took about 1
minute 35 seconds, anonymization took about 2 minutes 32 seconds, and
writing the anonymized data took about 15 seconds.
The second sample was over a 30-minute period and was about 711 MB.
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PowerShell was processing this log for over 22 hours before being cancelled.
Importing the CSV took about 8 hours 47 minutes 3 seconds. It was in the
process of anonymizing before being cancelled.
We created multiple variants of the script which incorporated paralleliza-
tion, reading the log as a stream, and reading the log in chunks. All variants
had worse performance than the first version.
We used the PowerShell script as a template and wrote a Python 2.7
version of the anonymization script. Running the first draft, unoptimized
Python script on the previous 700 MB log sample resulted in a start-to-finish
time of about 90 seconds. The substantial difference between this result and
the PowerShell results caused us to re-evaluate the anonymization approach.
Some amount of setup or installation would be worth the gained performance
benefits from using an alternative scripting language.
Table 3.1 displays the start-to-finish run times of some of the scripts we
created. All the run times shown are for a 3 MB log sample. PowerShell Stan-
dard reads the entire CSV into memory using the “import-csv” command-let,
performs anonymization to the data in memory, and then writes the data
back using the “export-csv” command-let. PowerShell Stream-Read reads
and anonymizes the file one line at a time, rather than importing the entire
CSV into memory. It then writes back using the “export-csv” command-let.
PowerShell Batched and Parallelized X reads in X lines of the file, starts a
new thread to perform anonymization on those X lines, and then writes the
anonymized data back as a new, smaller CSV. Python Read Then Write reads
and anonymizes the file one line at a time, keeping the contents in memory,
and then writes back to disk. Python Read-Anonymize-Write-Repeat reads
and anonymizes the file one line at a time. After it reaches a threshold of
10,000 lines, it writes the anonymized lines to disk. It therefore only keeps
10,000 lines worth of log contents in memory at a time. The significant per-
formance difference we observed between PowerShell and Python, both in
Technology Service’s test run and our own testing, motivated us to switch to
Python.
23
Table 3.1: Script Run-Times
Script Description Run-Time (seconds)
PowerShell 1.178
PowerShell Batched and Parallelized 500 4.291
PowerShell Batched and Parallelized 1,000 3.665
PowerShell Batched and Parallelized 10,000 3.920
PowerShell Batched and Parallelized 100,000 3.893
Python Read Then Write 0.440
Python Read-Anonymize-Write-Repeat 0.188
3.3.3 Transferring Data
Once the data has gone through anonymization pre-processing, it is ready
to be sent to the NSRG server. The anonymized data will be periodically
uploaded to a Technology Services-administered shared Box directory. This
is where all the anonymized logs will be collected and stored. We then syn-
chronize data from the shared Box directory with our Network and Security
Research Group (NSRG) server.
We wrote a Python script to automatically copy files from the shared Box
directory to the NSRG server. The script uses the official Box Python SDK
[36]. This uses the Box API to authenticate, copy, and delete. The script
authenticates as a user client and copies all files from the shared Box directory
to the NSRG server. When the files copies are complete, we then delete the
copied files from the Box directory. We do this to save space in Box (a
log over an eight hour period can be 3 GB or more). These data transfers
take place over HTTPS. Once on the NSRG server, the data is ready to be
processed.
3.3.4 Data Processing
All post-anonymization processing was done on the NSRG server. The server
has 128 GB of RAM and 32 logical processing cores. Statistics gathering
and graph generation were done using Python 3, particularly the numpy,
matplotlib, and scipy packages [37, 38, 39].
Every entry has a timestamp (“ time”) and one of two name fields will
be used. If an anonymized username is present, it will be in either the
“Account Name” field or the “Logon Account” field. Which field has the
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username depends on the type of event that is logged. We have observed that
when a username is in the “Logon Account” field, it is primarily for event
code 4776. We will discuss event codes more later. This event states that
“the domain controller attempted to validate the credentials for an account”
[40]. All other events that use a username field have the username in the
“Account Name” field. Another event code of interest is 4768: “A Kerberos
authentication ticket (TGT) was requested” [40]. Two more event codes
that will be important when looking at user activity are 4634 (“An account
was logged off”) and 4624 (“An account was successfully logged on”) [40].
The first iteration of the Python script was single-threaded with little
consideration put into memory consumption. This worked fine on a 5-minute
sample log we initially received from Technology Services. Once we received
logs covering 24 hours of activity at a time, our script was no longer practical.
The script was using all 128 GB of memory and disk swap memory was
continuing to increase.
We had to optimize the script to handle the amount of data we were dealing
with. The first iteration read every line of the CSV into a list. Each entry
in the list was a dictionary. The dictionary keys were the field names (e.g.,
Account Name, EventCode, etc.) and those mapped to the corresponding
fields’ values. This method was not feasible for even 24 hours of log data
at a time, let alone a week’s worth of data that we would later be handling.
These logs for one day were about 25-30 GB in total.
We overcame this by parallelizing the Python script. The revamped script
reads every log file in a given directory into memory simultaneously (up
to the number of cores available). Instead of saving a list of dictionaries
for all the data, we are more selective about the data we look at. With
each simultaneous file read, we build dictionaries of only information we
are interested in. For example, we want to look at the number of users we
encounter in the logs. We go through each line of each CSV (in parallel) and
make a dictionary of usernames. The usernames are the key and the value is
the number of times this user was encountered.
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3.4 Log Analysis
The anonymization script hashes usernames, but we want to ensure the same
username results in the same hash even if the field is formatted differently.
The script attempts to pull NetIDs out of username fields of various for-
mats. We use regular expressions to match all possible formats from the
sample set we obtained from Technology Services. For example, in the sam-
ple data of only our information, there are fields such as “CITES-IDM TDI
user\nCN=<NETID>,OU=People,DC=ad,DC=uillinois,DC=edu” where
<NETID> would be filled with a user NetID. We worked with Technology
Services to identify all patterns we might encounter, but we cannot guarantee
all of them are accounted for.
In the first iteration of data anonymization and analysis, we do not dis-
tinguish between users, services, and network shares. This was primarily
because we did not see services and shares in our sample log. We were un-
aware that they would be included in the live anonymized logs, let alone their
username patterns.
One of the first things we want to look at is usage patterns. We expect to
see periods of time with little activity, such as early in the morning (midnight
to 6am) before students and faculty arrive. We then expect to see an increase
of activity in the morning as students are waking up and faculty arrive. We
expect relatively steady activity throughout the day as students go to class,
others get out of class, and students and faculty use the internet throughout
the day. We expect a slight decline in the late afternoon or early evening
as faculty leave work for the day. We suggest a slight change because the
student population (about 44,000) is over eight times larger than the faculty
and staff population (about 5,000) [24].
We also speculate that Monday and Wednesday will have similar patterns,
and Tuesday and Thursday will look similar. Classes at UIUC are typically
scheduled at the same time on these day pairs. Therefore, we predict that
similar usage patterns will result from similar student class attendance pat-
terns.
We look at log data covering a week of events from November 1st to Novem-
ber 6th. These logs were a total of about 220 GB.
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3.4.1 Events
We are working with Windows event logs that are generated at Active Di-
rectory controllers. Each log entry has an event code describing what event
occurred. We should therefore investigate what events we are encountering
most. Table A.2 contains descriptions of each event code encountered. Ta-
ble B.1 shows statistics about all event codes from all user activity over the
entire data set. The top five event codes produced are 4624, 4634, 4776, and
4768. All of these events are related to a user logging in (or out). As a sanity
check, we see that events 4624 and 4634 are roughly equivalent. The total
number of account logins and log outs are about the same. From this we
can say that top events we encounter are for user authentication. The event
code descriptions for the top ten events sorted by total number of events are
in Table 3.2.
We can identify from this table some of the answers we seek. First we look
at TGT distribution. Event code 4768 is described as “a Kerberos authen-
tication ticket (TGT) was requested.” There were 46,717,178 total TGT
request events and 6,830,640 unique user TGT request events throughout
the week. This comes to about 6.8 TGTs per user if we assume a uniform
distribution.
Event code 4769, “A Kerberos service ticket was requested,” occurs 3,891,719
times. These events occur from 404 unique users. This comes out to about
9633 service tickets requested per user given a uniform distribution. We do
not currently possess information in the logs that identifies the service, but
it is intended for future work.
The next event, 4776, is described as “the domain controller attempted to
validate the credentials for an account.” From discussions with Technology
Services, we know that these events occur as a result of an NTLM authen-
tication. There were 95,899,306 total NTLM authentications and 4,640,444
unique user NTLM authentications. This becomes about 20.66 NTLM au-
thentications per user assuming a uniform distribution.
We also see some event codes that correspond to administrative tasks, such
as event 4672 and 5136. We take a closer look at these events later.
We want to look also at event codes produced from unique users. Perhaps
users have misconfigured hardware or software. Maybe some are having
connection or authentication problems. There could also be automated tasks
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Table 3.2: Top 10 EventCode Descriptions Sorted by Total Connections
Event Code Description
4624 An account was successfully logged on
4634 An account was logged off
4776 The domain controller attempted to validate the
credentials for an account
4768 A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was re-
quested
4672 Special privileges assigned to new logon
4771 Kerberos pre-authentication failed
4648 A logon was attempted using explicit credentials
4769 A Kerberos service ticket was requested
5136 A directory service object was modified
4625 An account failed to log on
that rapidly log in and out. In an attempt to reduce these events, we look
at event codes per user. In other words, a user account only contributes one
count for any events they produced. The event code descriptions for the top
ten events sorted by unique users are in Table 3.3.
We see many of the same events top this chart. Login (4624) and log off
(4634) are about the same again. According to [40], log off events are not
properly logged by Windows until the system restarts. They further say that
a logoff event may not be recorded if there is an unexpected shutdown or
loss of network connection. These seem to be likely explanations for the two
events not being exactly the same.
When we compare the top contributors in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 (or the
numbers in Appendix B.1), we see that NTLM authentication events are a
larger percentage of the total events compared to the unique events. This
indicates that accounts are issuing 4776 NTLMauthentication events more
frequently than the other login/logoff events.
Table 3.4 shows how many instances of each event code were found without
a username associated with the event. Event codes that do not have missing
usernames are not listed. Over 31% of login and logout events are without
a username. Almost 90% of “special privileges assigned to new logon” do
not contain a username. About 65% of “a privileged service was called” are
without a username, too. As we will see later, a subset of administrative
tasks leave the username field empty.
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Table 3.3: Top Ten EventCode Descriptions Sorted by Users
Event Code Description
4768 A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was re-
quested
4624 An account was successfully logged on
4634 An account was logged off
4776 The domain controller attempted to validate the
credentials for an account
4771 Kerberos pre-authentication failed
4648 A logon was attempted using explicit credentials
4756 A member was added to a security-enabled uni-
versal group
4732 A member was added to a security-enabled local
group
4733 A member was removed from a security-enabled
local group
4625 An account failed to log on
Table 3.4: Number of EventCodes that Appear with Empty String
Username
Event Code Number With Missing
Username
Percent of Total
4624 33,730,337 31.21
4634 33,730,104 31.21
4672 33,422,666 89.46
4673 211,539 65.33
4648 4,702 0.036
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3.4.2 Access Behavior
We next characterize user activity over time. We look at event log data
covering a week’s time. Figure 3.1 shows total user activity from midnight
on November 1st to midnight November 7th. Activity is grouped into one
hour bins. This total activity includes events that the same user may have
produced within the bin. We see a pattern of lower activity in the early
morning, increasing activity over the day that peaks around noon, followed
by decreasing activity throughout the rest of the day. There are spikes of
extremely high activity at about 2am every day. There is also an extreme
spike at about 11am on 11-01. We analyze these more later.
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Figure 3.1: User Activity over Time
To avoid a few power-users from distorting the graph, we also look at
unique activity. Figure 3.2 shows unique user activity over the same time
period. Activity is again grouped into one hour bins. This unique activity
includes events produced by unique individuals only. Even if the same user
produced multiple events within the bin, it is counted as one event. We
immediately see a difference in the magnitude of activity. Total non-unique
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user events reached almost 10 million in one hour. The unique graph shows
activity maxing out at no more than 120,000 events in an hour. This indicates
that there are users producing many events per hour. The reoccurring 2am
spikes are no longer obvious in this view. We can see defined peaks for
each day. Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Monday have about the same
magnitude. Saturday and Sunday clearly have fewer events being produced.
Contrary to what we predicted, Monday and Wednesday do not have obvious
shared patterns when compared to any other days.
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Figure 3.2: Unique User Activity over Time
Figure 3.3 shows the top five most seen event codes over time. Figure 3.4
shows the next five most frequent event codes over time. These are broken
up to make it easier to read. Please refer back to Table 3.2 for the top ten
event code descriptions. From these we can see what specific events causes
the activity we previously saw.
Table C.1 in Appendix C lists the correlation coefficients calculated be-
tween each event code pair. We focus on the top ten events for identifying
correlation.
We see from the pattern of 4768 that TGTs are requested at a steady
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rate, increasing from early morning to mid-afternoon each day and gradually
decreasing as the day goes on. Event 4776 (the domain controller attempted
to validate the credentials for an account) occurs more frequently and in a
more bursty pattern, but still following the trend of increasing to noon and
decreasing after. Event 4776 activity is also lower on Saturday, then spiking
to a weekly high Sunday after midnight.
The lines for 4634 (an account was logged off) and 4624 (an account was
successfully logged on) are so similar that they are merged together on the
graph. These two events have a correlation coefficient of 0.999. The one hour
binning we did indicates that the logins and logouts are occurring within the
same hour.
Event 4624 (logged in) and event 4776 (DC attempted to validate creden-
tials) have a correlation coefficient of 0.586. Looking at Figure 3.3, we see
that when one of them spikes, they spike together, but in non-spiking situa-
tions, their patterns do not mirror. Possibly a subset of logins are followed
by credential validation. Since events 4624 and 4634 are so closely correlated,
4776 also has a correlation coefficient of 0.586 with event 4634.
Event 4776 (DC attempted to validate credentials) and event 4768 (TGT
requested) have a correlation coefficient of 0.676. Event 4776 has a correlation
coefficient of 0.628 with event 4769 (Kerberos service ticket was requested),
which is shown in Figure 3.4. While they do not have the same magnitude,
they follow the same trend of increasing from morning to mid-afternoon,
followed by decreasing.
Events 4768 and 4769 have a correlation coefficient of 0.803. This again
appears to be the situation where they have differing magnitudes (about 5
times magnitude difference) but similar temporal trends.
Events 4624, 4634, and 4672 (Special privileges assigned to new logon)
have a correlation coefficient of 0.868. This event will not give us much
information about user usage, according to Technology Services, as it is an
administrative event. This can still imply that a portion of the login and
logout events are related to these 4672 administrative events.
We investigate now the uncharacteristic spike that occurs in Figure 3.1
on 11-01 at about 11am. If we look at Figures 3.3 and 3.4, we see there is
a correlation between events 4624, 4634, 4672, and 4776. There are about
2.6 million events occurring for each of 4624 and 4634 within the one hour.
There are about 1.9 million events for 4672 in that same hour. There are also
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about 1.4 million 4776 events that contribute to the spike. In addition, there
are 1.9 million events during that hour that have the same “Source Network
Address” (i.e., IP address). There are also 1.9 million events during the
hour that originate from a single username. An additional 1.5 million events
originate from a single, different username. This indicates that one or more
administrative accounts are logging in, performing an action that is assigning
a special privilege to a new logon, and then logging off. We say that this is
an administrative account because only an account with escalated privilege
can perform this event.
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Figure 3.3: Top 5 Event Codes over Time
We next investigate the spikes occuring at 2am every day. Looking at
Figure 3.4 reveals the event code primarily involved in the 2am spikes.
Event 4648 (A logon was attempted using explicit credentials) has a small
amount of consistent activity every day, along with one burst of activity at
about 2am every day. This event could also be connected to the spikes we see
in Figure 3.3 that also occur at about 2am. The spikes are less apparent in
the latter graph due to the magnitudes of the other activities. Upon further
inspection, we see the 2am bursts consist of events 4776, 4624, and 4648.
The event code descriptions and repeated time indicate this is a scheduled,
automated task. We return to investigate this reoccurring pattern shortly.
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Event 4771 could be an interesting event for IT to follow. The description
reads that a “Kerberos pre-authentication failed.” There is a consistent level
of these events that occur throughout the week. Some amount of these events
above a certain threshold might be an indication of suspicious activity.
Wed
nes
day
 00:
00
Wed
nes
day
 12:
00
Thu
rsda
y 00
:00
Thu
rsda
y 12
:00
Frid
ay 0
0:00
Frid
ay 1
2:00
Satu
rday
 00:
00
Satu
rday
 12:
00
Sun
day
 00:
00
Sun
day
 12:
00
Mon
day
 00:
00
Mon
day
 12:
00
Tue
sda
y 00
:00
Time
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
Nu
m
be
r o
f E
ve
nt
s
Number of Top 6-10 EventCodes Encountered Over Time
EventCodes
5136
4625
4771
4648
4769
Figure 3.4: Top 6-10 Event Codes over Time
To make any daily repeating patterns clear, we now look at hourly usage
graphs averaged over the week. This means taking the average of user activity
per hour across each day. For example, 9:00 on the graph is the activity at
9:00 averaged across every day of the week. This is illustrated in Figure
3.5. The graph reiterates the daily patterns we previously saw, consisting of
activity increasing from early morning to about noon, followed by decreasing
activity. The average barely falls below 2 million events per hour at its
lowest points. There is a high point early in the morning at about 2am,
corresponding to the daily peaks we saw previously.
We look at the daily averaged events triggered by unique users once again.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.6. In doing so, we see that the spike at 2am
is gone. We speculated this could be some automated event that causes
a sudden spike of network event activity. We reached out to Technology
Services about this spike. They identified the source of the 2am activity
to be a service account in an IT networking department. They suggested
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Figure 3.5: Average Daily Activity
that this could be “a nightly firmware check or log maintenance on all the
networking switches on campus.” Unique user activity per hour ranges from
about 60,000 to over 90,000 events through the day. The unique login graph
has been smoothed in comparison to the total login graph.
We found a total of 302,510 unique users. The maximum number of events
created with the same user is 69,847,763. Upon further investigation, this
is actually an empty string username. This means that these are all of the
combined events for when a username is not present. This is most likely
many users. The second highest number of events is produced by a non-
empty string username. This account produced 11,151,510 events.
Next we look at the frequency of user activity. Figure 3.7 shows the CDF
of user events over the week. On the x axis is a log-scale of the number of
times a user creates an event. On the y axis is the frequency of events. The
markers are every 10%. This tells us that about 5% of all users only create
one event. About 50% of users create 100 events or less. About 70% of users
create 1,000 events or less. Over 95% of users create 10,000 events or less.
Figure 3.8 shows the PDF of user events over the week as a scatter plot.
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Figure 3.6: Average Unique Daily Activity
The y axis is the number of times a user performs an event. The x axis is the
number of users that performed y number of events. Note that both axes are
log scaled. This plot resembles an exponential decay in the number of events
performed by users. The outliers are on the left end of the x axis. These
individual users are the source of far more events than the rest of the users.
3.4.3 User Distribution across Domain Controllers
We next characterize user activity distributed across the campus domain
controllers. We want to look at how many events are hitting each domain
controller (also called a “host” in the logs) over time. Figure 3.9 shows
the total number of events that target each domain controller over the week.
Figure 3.10 illustrates the same but limited to unique users. Both graphs
are binned into 24 hour periods.
There are two Amazon Web Services domain controllers (AWSDC), two
Chicago Domain Controllers (CDC), three RADIUS servers, and six Ur-
bana Domain Controllers (UDC). The CDCs serve infrastructure primarily
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Figure 3.7: CDF of Number of Times All Users Login
in Chicago, where they are located, but not exclusively. They can still be
reached from Urbana if a user explicitly tries to. The AWS DCs are for
university AWS resources to use rather than connecting to a DC on campus.
The Radius servers are used exclusively for Radius authentication, which
are VPN connections and IllinoisNet WiFi connections. Of the three Radius
servers, two are virtual machines (VMs) running on VMWare infrastructure
in Urbana, and the third is a VM running on infrastructure in Chicago. All
other traffic is served to the UDCs, located across the Urbana UIUC campus.
The majority of all traffic we see is going through the UDCs each day.
When considering only unique users, we see the same usage primarily through
the UDCs. When we compare the total and the unique, we notice that total
AWSDC and CDC traffic appears to be originating from fewer individuals.
This is because there are fewer unique user events and a larger number of
total events for these two DC groups.
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Figure 3.9: Total Number of Events at Each DC per Day
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Figure 3.10: Number of Events From Unique Users at Each DC per Day
3.4.4 Filtering the Data
After discovering the source of the 2am spikes, we requested non-user-identifying
information from Technology Services about the accounts that are the source
of most events. They investigated between 11-01 and 11-06, and gave us de-
scriptions of the top 20 users based on events produced. Table 3.5 shows these
sources. We note that because of the anonymization process, we do not see
the numbers match up exactly. We believe this is because of the grouping
that occurs while anonymizing. That is, we might have fewer events linked
to individual users because the usernames may not have been pulled out of
the username field correctly. This is because we cannot guarantee we know
all username patterns that exist. Technology Services knows the exact user
that produced each event.
We now look at a second iteration of data anonymization and analysis.
This time, we filter out services and network shares. Technology Services
informed us that shares always have a dollar sign ($) and services are sup-
posed to have a hyphen (-) in the name. We modify our regexes to account for
these. We check if the username field is a share that includes a username. For
example, “UDC02$\n<NETID>” where <NETID> is the NetID of a user
that might be logging in and authenticating with domain controller UDC02.
If it has the format of only a share with no username (e.g., “UDC02$”), we
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Table 3.5: Top 20 Sources of Events Over the Week
Rank Number of Events Source Description
1 36,653,169 DC
2 34,412,744 DC
3 26,896,567 DC
4 17,175,232 Service
5 16,645,652 DC
6 10,887,342 Service
7 7,664,897 DC
8 5,392,531 Service
9 4,004,513 Service
10 3,705,068 DC
11 3,367,226 Staff
12 2,003,759 DC
13 1,918,936 Staff
14 1,884,371 Computer
15 1,785,325 Service
16 1,752,277 Student
17 1,707,985 Student
18 1,652,927 Service
19 1,613,793 DC
20 1,533,342 Computer
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do not keep this event entry. If we find a hyphen in the username field, we
do not keep this event entry, either. These efforts were additional attempts
to filter out events that are automated or do not correctly represent a user-
triggered action. We are now looking at information which we believe is more
representative of user activity only.
We expect to see a smaller magnitude of events. If the reoccurring spikes
are caused by service and/or share accounts, we also expect to see less spikes
in the new set.
We first look at the event codes to get an idea of if or how the data we
are about to examine might look differently. Table B.2 contains the event
codes, total number of each event, total users that generated the event, and
connections per user for events in the logs after filtering. The top five event
codes, which are reiterated in Table 3.6, are now events that are exclusive
to user login behavior. We no longer see log off events, however. Event 4624
has been filtered out entirely. This indicates that the source, or sources, of
log off events were services, shares, or both. From what we saw in Table 3.4,
4624 accounted for 31.21% of empty string account names, as well. This
means we should expect to see a decline of at least 33,730,337 empty string
usernames, and 108,078,498 fewer overall events.
We also see that event 4648 (logon was attempted using explicit creden-
tials) is no longer encountered in the logs. This suggests that all 4648 events
were triggered by service or share accounts.
Events 4733, 4732, 4756, 4674, and 4757 in the top ten reveal that we have
not filtered out all administrative events. Since we have filtered out services
and shares, this indicates that the sources of these administrative tasks are
non-service and non-share accounts. This does not exclude the possibility
that the generation of these events is automated.
We find there are 121,834 unique users found in the week of time. This is
based on the two username fields only. The pre-filtered logs contained 302,510
unique users over the week, making a difference of 180,676 usernames. Table
3.7 contains the event codes that that contain empty-string usernames and
how many are encountered in the logs over the week.
In the filtered data, we see 35,507,152 TGTs were requested from 90,913
unique users, resulting in about 390.6 TGT requests per user with a uniform
distribution. This is 11,210,026 less total requests than before filtering.
In addition, there are 78,763,663 attempts to validate credentials (NTLM)
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Table 3.6: Top Ten EventCode Descriptions after Filtering
Event Code Description
4776 The domain controller attempted to validate the
credentials for an account
4768 A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was re-
quested
4634 An account was logged off
4771 Kerberos pre-authentication failed
4769 A Kerberos service ticket was requested
4733 A member was removed from a security-enabled
local group
4732 A member was added to a security-enabled local
group
4756 A member was added to a security-enabled uni-
versal group
4674 An operation was attempted on a privileged ob-
ject
4757 A member was removed from a security-enabled
universal group
coming from 91,315 unique users. This is 862.5 events per user with a uniform
distribution. This is a loss of 17,135,643 in terms of total NTLM authenti-
cation attempts.
In the filtered data, we see that Kerberos service tickets were requested
2,748,806 times from 288 unique users. This comes out to about 9544.4 ser-
vice tickets requested per user given a uniform distribution. This is 1,142,913
less total service tickets than the previous data set.
The maximum number of events from a single user in the filtered results
is 11,296,413. This is the same username that we found to have created the
most events in the non-filtered data, as well. Note that the number of events
produced by the same user this time is more than previously (a difference of
144,903). This could be an indication that the update to our anonymization
script is working as intended for this purpose. It may have previously not
credited this user with events the user actually produced, and now is. This
would explain the increase in events between scripts.
Notice also that the empty string is not the number one contributor any-
more. As we see in Table 3.7, we are still observing events that have empty
string usernames. The amount encountered is now fewer.
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Table 3.7: Number of EventCodes that Appear with Empty String
Username in the Filtered Logs
Event Code Number With Missing
Username
Percent of Total
4769 2299135 83.64
4776 108414 0.14
4768 20 0.00
4954 14 100.00
4946 10 100.00
4948 10 100.00
4755 1 0.13
4720 1 20.00
5141 1 100.00
3.4.5 Access Behavior
Figure 3.11 shows total user activity from midnight on November 1st to
midnight November 7th. Activity is again grouped into one hour bins. We
see a pattern of lower activity in the early morning, increasing activity over
the day that peaks around noon, and decreasing activity throughout the rest
of the day. We continue to see the repeated 2am spikes. The magnitudes of all
events are less than before. The daily noontime peaks are about 1.8 million
events now, while we previously saw noontime peaks of about 5 million. +
Figure 3.12 shows unique user activity over the same time period. Activity
is again grouped into one-hour bins. This follows the same trend as the non-
filtered graph, with reduced magnitude of events. We also see the 2am spikes
are no longer obvious in this view. We can see defined peaks for each day,
with the weekends having less activity.
Figure 3.13 shows the top five most seen event codes over time. Figure
3.14 shows the next five most frequent event codes over time. As mentioned
previously, the top five events are all related to account login activities. Recall
that event 4624 (logged on) has been filtered and so is no longer present.
Table C.2 in Appendix C lists the correlation coefficients calculated be-
tween each event code pair after filtering. We focus on the top ten events for
identifying correlation.
Event 4776 (DC attempted to validate credentials) and event 4768 (TGT
requested) have a correlation coefficient of 0.749.
Events 4768 and 4769 have a correlation coefficient of 0.798. This again
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Figure 3.11: User Activity over Time after Filter
appears to be the situation where they have differing magnitudes (about 3
times magnitude difference) but similar temporal trends.
Event 4769 has a correlation coefficient of 0.6735 with event 4776.
Events 4634 and 4776 have a correlation coefficient of 0.719. This may
indicate that a subset of credential validation and log off events occur in the
same hour time window.
There is a correlation coefficient of 0.665 between events 4768 and 4771
(Kerberos pre-authentication failed).
Events 4732 (A member was added to a security-enabled local group) and
4733 (A member was removed from a security-enabled local group) have a
correlation coefficient of 0.999.
Events 4732 and 4757 (A member was removed from a security-enabled
universal group) have a correlation coefficient of 0.657.
We see a seemingly uncharacteristic spike of event 4771 (pre-auth failure)
that occurs on Monday afternoon. When asked about this, Technology Ser-
vices noted that the spike was caused primarily by one staff user on one
computer. They note that this was one of the users that also showed up in
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Figure 3.12: Unique User Activity over Time after Filter
the top 20 list.
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Figure 3.13: Top 5 Event Codes over Time after Filter
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Figure 3.14: Top 6-10 Event Codes over Time after Filter
We now look at hourly usage graphs averaged over the week, illustrated
in Figure 3.15. The average barely falls below 600,000 events per hour at
its lowest points. There is a high point early in the morning at about 2am,
corresponding again to the daily peaks we saw previously. We see a trend of
activity increasing from early morning to about noon, followed by decreasing
activity.
The average daily unique user activity can be found in Figure 3.16. We
see a drop in magnitude of events, from the 500,000-2,000,000 range to the
25,000-50,000 range. The same users are responsible for multiple events per
hour. This graph makes the trend more apparent: lower in the morning
leading to an increase towards noon, and a slow decline as the afternoon
goes on.
Next we look at the frequency of user activity. Figure 3.17 shows the CDF
of user events over the week. On the x axis is a log-scale of the number of
times a user logs in. On the y axis is the frequency of logins. The markers
are every 10%. This tells us that about 5% of all users only create one event.
About 20% of users create 10 events or less. About 50% of users create 100
events or less. Over 85% of users create 1,000 events or less. About 99% of
users create 10,000 or less. The max number of logins from a single user was
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Figure 3.15: Average Daily Activity after Filter
11,296,413.
Figure 3.18 shows the PDF of user events over the week as a scatter plot.
The y axis is the number of times a user performs an event. The x axis is the
number of users that performed y number of events. Note that both axes are
log scaled. This plot resembles an exponential decay in the number of events
performed by users. The outliers are on the left end of the x axis. These
individual users are the source of far more events than the rest of the users.
3.4.6 User Distribution across Domain Controllers
We next characterize user activity distributed across the campus domain
controllers. We want to look at how many events are hitting each domain
controller over time. Figure 3.19 shows the total number of events that target
each domain controller over the week. Figure 3.20 illustrates the same but
limited to unique users. Both graphs are binned into 24 hour periods.
The majority of all traffic we see is going through the UDCs each day.
When considering only unique users, we see the same usage primarily through
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Figure 3.16: Average Unique Daily Activity after Filter
the UDCs. When we compare the total and the unique, we notice that total
AWSDC and CDC traffic appears to be originating from fewer individuals.
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Figure 3.17: CDF of Number of Times All Users Login after Filter
49
100 101 102 103 104
Number of Users
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
Nu
m
 T
im
es
 A
 U
se
r P
er
fo
rm
s E
ve
nt
PDF of Num Times All Users Perform Event
Figure 3.18: PDF of Number of Times All Users Login after Filter
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Figure 3.19: Total Number of Events at Each DC per Day after Filter
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after Filter
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
4.1 Future Work
In the future, it would be useful to build models of how an attacker would
move laterally in the network. We aim to gather data that an attacker
would look for in order to gain access to other resources on a network. This
includes, for example, Kerberos service tickets. We would assume that an
attacker has already compromised a computer on the network and has access
to a user account. The account may also have administrative privileges.
The computer’s memory would contain usernames, password hashes/keys,
TGTs, and service tickets. An attacker with sufficient access can retrieve
this information. The attacker can then use this information to authorize to
other computers or resources, thus successfully moving laterally in a network.
With information about service tickets, we could build attack models of
how an adversary could traverse a network. If we know how many service
tickets are distributed to shared computers (i.e., a computer lab desktop), we
can start to understand how many accounts could be impersonated through
stolen tickets. The number of accounts on shared computers alone could also
tell us how many account credentials could be stolen from hijacked hashes.
In addition, we want to look at user mobility. It would be beneficial to
know how user movement appears on the network. This includes spatial-
temporal movement. This would be useful for detecting lateral movement,
for example, because mobility would put constraints on where an attacker
could log in. A user should not normally be simultaneously logged in to
and active at two computer labs that are across a campus. It would also
be suspicious for a user to log out of one machine and immediately log in
to another machine located on the other side of campus. These could both
be indicators of an attacker attempting to use stolen credentials in order to
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move laterally in the network.
4.2 Conclusion
In this thesis, we analyzed Windows event logs produced at Active Direc-
tory domain controllers. The network we examined was a university campus
consisting of over 44,000 students and an additional 5,000 faculty and staff.
The logs were over a week of network activity. We characterized the activity
we saw from users, services, and shares. We described usage over a week,
detailed usage based on event codes encountered, looked at daily average
usage, and discussed distribution across the domain controllers. We then at-
tempted to filter out the services and shares to focus on user activity alone.
We repeated the previous analysis with the filtered data to gain additional
insight on network behavior without services and shares. We saw that ser-
vices and shares consist of a significant portion of network usage, including
some of the outlier behavior.
Some of the data cannot be seen by looking at user activity alone. We
saw that excluding services and shares also prevents us from seeing certain
correlations, such as login and logout events. At the same time, services and
shares can hinder us from seeing user activity by overshadowing users with
spikes of activity.
The data supports multiple trends which are now reiterated. On average,
the number of events created is lower in the early morning, increases towards
noon, and starts to decline in the mid afternoon. Fewer events are generated
on the weekend when compared to weekdays. In the filtered data, about
50% of users create 100 events or less and about 85% create 1,000 events or
less. Less than 5% of users create more than 10,000 events. In both filtered
and pre-filtered data, the top five events encountered are associated with
user sessions (i.e., login, logout, authentication) or Kerberos ticket requests.
Most events are generated at the Urbana Domain Controllers. The second
largest number of events (although about 15 times smaller) are generated at
the RADIUS DCs that serve only WiFi and VPN.
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APPENDIX A
LOG CONTENTS
We needed to know the exact contents of the logs we would be analyzing. We
also needed to determine which fields in the log contained revealing informa-
tion that must be anonymized. We received a sample log from Technology
Services. This log contained information from only our NSRG lab volunteers.
Table A.1 contains descriptions of each field we encountered in the sample
log.
Table A.1: Field Descriptions
Name Description
Account Domain The domain
Account Name Name of account just authenticated (when re-
questing TGT)
Additional Information Unknown
Authentication Package Always “MICROSOFT AUTHENTICATION
PACKAGE V1 0”
Client Address IP address of user
Client Port Source (user) port
ComputerName Active Directory controller that received the re-
quest
Elevated Token Believed to be related to User Account Control
(network admin account)
Error Code Integer code to describe the reason for an error
EventCode Integer used to describe the event
EventType Unknown (empty or 0)
Group Domain Domain of affected group
Group Name Name of affected group
Impersonation Level Unknown, added in Windows Server 2012
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Table A.1 Continued
Name Description
Key Length The length of the generated session key, will be
0 if no session key was requested.
Keywords Seems to be Windows verification point, always
“Audit Success”
Linked Logon ID Unknown, believed to be linked to Transited
Services
Logon Account Name of the account when NTLM authentica-
tion is used
Logon GUID Similar to Logon ID, but can potentially be cor-
related with event 4769 on Domain Controller
Logon ID Unique (between reboots) number for the logon
session. Can be used to correlate backwards to
logon event 4624
Logon Process Blank or “Advapi”
Logon Type How the user logged on, described below
NTLMErrCode Unknown
Network Account Domain Unknown (appears in 4624)
Network Account Name Unknown (appears in 4624)
Network Address Same as Source Network Address
OpCode Always “Info”
Package Name NTLM only Which version of NTLM is used
Pre Authentication Type Unknown
Privileges Names of admin-equivalent privileges of user at
logon
Process ID Executable process ID created from event 4688
Process Name Path of executable process created from event
4688
RecordNumber Identifier for this transaction. Not unique
across DCs
Restricted Admin Mode “Yes” for Remote Desktop Connections where
client specified this mode, “-” otherwise
Result Code An error code for TGT requests (details below)
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Table A.1 Continued
Name Description
Security ID SID of user account or affected group
Service ID Seems to always be empty
Service Name Always “krbtgt”
SourceName Always “Microsoft Windows security auditing.”
Source Network Address IP address of user’s computer but typically
empty
Source Port Source TCP port of logon request (random)
Source Workstation Name of computer where logon attempt origi-
nated
Supplied Realm Name Domain name of account
Target Server Name Appears to be empty or “localhost”
TaskCategory A brief string description of the event (not de-
tailed)
Ticket Encryption Type Unknown
Ticket Options Unknown
Transited Services Service acting on behalf of user for Kerberos au-
thentication (client authenticates with service
another way)
Type Name of directory service, always “Informa-
tion” for us
User ID SID of account used to login (TGT)
Virtual Account “Yes” when services are configured for this lo-
gon type, “No” otherwise
Workstation Name Computer name where user is physically
present. In our case, requests are made on be-
half of the user and so this becomes the DC
time Timestamp of when event was generated
host Active Directory controller that received the re-
quest
The EventCode fields listed in Table A.2 are integer codes used to describe
what event has occurred.
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Table A.2: EventCode Descriptions
Event Code Description
4624 An account was successfully logged on
4625 An account failed to log on
4634 An account was logged off 1
4647 User initiated logoff
4648 A logon was attempted using explicit creden-
tials
4672 Special privileges assigned to new logon
4673 A privileged service was called
4674 An operation was attempted on a privileged ob-
ject
4675 SIDs were filtered
4716 Trusted domain information was modified
4720 A user account was created
4722 A user account was enabled
4723 An attempt was made to change an accounts´
password
4724 An attempt was made to reset an accounts pass-
word
4725 A user account was disabled
4727 A security-enabled global group was created
4728 A member was added to a security-enabled
global group
4729 A member was removed from a security-enabled
global group
4731 A security-enabled local group was created
4732 A member was added to a security-enabled local
group
4734 A security-enabled local group was deleted
4735 A security-enabled local group was changed
4737 A security-enabled global group was changed
1“This event does not necessarily indicate the time that a user has stopped using a
system. For example, if the computer is shut down or loses network connectivity it may
not record a logoff event at all.” [40]
61
Table A.2 Continued
Event Code Description
4738 A user account was changed
4740 A user account was locked out
4755 A security-enabled universal group was changed
4756 A member was added to a security-enabled uni-
versal group
4757 A member was removed from a security-enabled
universal group
4768 A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was re-
quested
4769 A Kerberos service ticket was requested
4771 Kerberos pre-authentication failed
4776 The domain controller attempted to validate
the credentials for an account
4781 The name of an account was changed
4799 A security-enabled local group membership was
enumerated2
4904 An attempt was made to register a security
event source
4905 An attempt was made to unregister a security
event source
4907 Auditing settings on object were changed
4946 A change has been made to Windows Firewall
exception list. A rule was added
4948 A change has been made to Windows Firewall
exception list. A rule was deleted
4954 Windows Firewall Group Policy settings has
changed. The new settings have been applied
4985 The state of a transaction has changed
5038 Code integrity determined that the image hash
of a file is not valid
2“This event is valuable for catching so-called APT actors who are scoping out the
local accounts on a system they have compromised so that they extend their horizontal
kill chain. Of course false positives are possible.” [40]
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Table A.2 Continued
Event Code Description
5058 Key file operation
5059 Key migration operation
5136 A directory service object was modified
5137 A directory service object was created
5141 A directory service object was deleted
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APPENDIX B
EVENT CODES ENCOUNTERED
B.1 Event Codes Before Filter
Table B.1 shows statistics about all event codes from all user activity over
the one week data set. It contains the event code, total times encountered,
individual users that have produced that event code, and the connections per
user (total/unique).
Table B.1: EventCode Frequency
EventCode Total Connections Users Connections Per
User
4624 108078498 6569653 16.45117299
4634 108059073 6516457 16.58248846
4776 95899306 4640444 20.66597636
4768 46717178 6830640 6.839355902
4672 37356928 17929 2083.603547
4771 16948020 406600 41.68229218
4648 13203323 246895 53.47748233
4769 3891719 31941 121.8408628
5136 779206 4219 184.6897369
4625 494143 36980 13.36243916
4673 323799 1897 170.6900369
4733 274763 52660 5.217679453
4732 272926 53684 5.083935623
4735 153498 289 531.1349481
4756 141359 74908 1.887101511
4755 139976 342 409.2865497
4674 110029 630 174.6492063
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Table B.1 Continued
EventCode Total Connections Users Connections Per
User
4675 57783 314 184.022293
4757 39153 20193 1.938939236
4740 37117 22597 1.642563172
4728 33561 15150 2.215247525
4737 30858 470 65.65531915
4738 5434 4801 1.131847532
4816 5244 277 18.93140794
4985 5128 646 7.938080495
4724 4954 4602 1.076488483
4723 1155 862 1.339907193
4729 1061 691 1.535455861
4722 1051 1026 1.024366472
4799 854 42 20.33333333
4907 633 1 633
4726 525 523 1.003824092
4781 439 49 8.959183673
4725 411 407 1.00982801
4720 380 376 1.010638298
4727 346 154 2.246753247
4904 198 65 3.046153846
4905 196 64 3.0625
4730 156 22 7.090909091
4754 113 38 2.973684211
4767 24 18 1.333333333
4731 23 11 2.090909091
4758 20 12 1.666666667
4954 14 2 7
4946 10 1 10
4948 10 1 10
5058 8 5 1.6
5061 8 5 1.6
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Table B.1 Continued
EventCode Total Connections Users Connections Per
User
5137 5 1 5
4734 4 2 2
4764 4 2 2
4716 3 3 1
4647 2 2 1
5059 2 1 2
5038 1 1 1
5141 1 1 1
B.2 Event Codes Encountered After Filter
Table B.2 is similar to Table B.1, but applied to the data gathered after
shares and services were filtered out.
Table B.2: EventCode Frequency After Filter
EventCode Total Connections Users Connections Per
User
4776 78763663 91315 862.5490117
4768 35507152 90913 390.5618778
4634 20675728 46444 445.1754371
4771 15566220 38394 405.4336615
4769 2748806 288 9544.465278
4733 270443 6507 41.56185646
4732 268594 6794 39.53400059
4756 140075 19313 7.252886657
4674 58864 1 58864
4757 38307 5422 7.065105127
4728 30506 11752 2.595813479
4737 29408 54 544.5925926
4672 22773 1 22773
4816 5289 1 5289
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Table B.2 Continued
EventCode Total Connections Users Connections Per
User
4729 1067 471 2.265392781
4755 774 30 25.8
5136 699 21 33.28571429
4735 137 13 10.53846154
4738 65 49 1.326530612
4781 53 17 3.117647059
4723 35 27 1.296296296
4985 24 1 24
4724 23 19 1.210526316
4767 22 13 1.692307692
4954 14 1 14
4727 13 9 1.444444444
4731 12 2 6
4754 12 3 4
4946 10 1 10
4948 10 1 10
4720 5 5 1
4722 5 5 1
4730 4 3 1.333333333
4764 4 2 2
4716 3 1 3
5058 2 1 2
5059 2 1 2
5061 2 1 2
4725 1 1 1
4734 1 1 1
4758 1 1 1
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APPENDIX C
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
C.1 Event Code Correlation Coefficients Before Filter
Table C.1 contains every combination of event code pairs and their correlation
coefficients. The correlation coefficients were calculated using the Pandas
(Python package) “coeff” function, which calculates the Pearson correlation
coefficient between two variables. The calculation takes into account the
time that the event occurred and amount of each event that occurred at that
time.
Table C.1: EventCode Correlation Coefficients Before Filter
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4648 4764 1
4674 4764 1
4675 4764 1
4722 4764 1
4724 4764 1
4725 4764 1
4726 4730 1
4726 4731 1
4726 4767 1
4727 4764 1
4728 4764 1
4730 4799 1
4730 4904 1
4730 4905 1
4731 4758 1
4738 4764 1
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4755 4764 1
4756 4764 1
4757 4764 1
4764 4767 1
5058 5061 1
4624 4634 0.999999295
4733 4735 0.999753925
4732 4735 0.99969289
4732 4733 0.99966972
4672 5058 0.999174778
4672 5061 0.999174778
4904 4905 0.998531774
4728 4737 0.997733244
4725 4730 0.984649292
4757 4781 0.98023896
4729 5058 0.977355555
4729 5061 0.977355555
4732 4781 0.964058999
4735 4781 0.960712481
4733 4781 0.955672795
4731 4737 0.95287689
4730 4733 0.944273473
4729 4731 0.911558399
4728 4731 0.907736977
4733 4757 0.903165522
4730 4735 0.900351388
4724 4738 0.896848452
4675 4769 0.893406711
4624 5058 0.873425875
4624 5061 0.873425875
4634 5058 0.872289324
4634 5061 0.872289324
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4634 4672 0.867899221
4624 4672 0.867838746
4673 4674 0.862043867
4756 4758 0.855349231
4767 4781 0.833561372
4720 4722 0.81564133
4768 4769 0.80322053
4727 5058 0.798007469
4727 5061 0.798007469
4724 4769 0.789314903
4754 4905 0.786795792
4675 4724 0.774424169
4724 4768 0.75575013
4728 5058 0.754605607
4728 5061 0.754605607
4672 4754 0.750945002
4675 4768 0.749302296
4732 5058 0.72097162
4732 5061 0.72097162
4723 4769 0.71994691
4733 4799 0.719340672
4722 4738 0.713105768
4758 4985 0.713069619
4730 5136 0.69954063
4634 4754 0.692171983
4624 4754 0.692144864
4754 4904 0.686406473
4799 4904 0.679980218
4675 4723 0.678999065
4768 4776 0.676386726
4738 4769 0.672349607
4733 4904 0.655246376
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4723 4724 0.649664721
4738 4768 0.648991192
4769 4776 0.628011373
4675 4738 0.625400361
4733 4905 0.595484633
4754 4756 0.594686783
4723 4768 0.59271681
4757 4758 0.591446592
4755 4767 0.586575459
4634 4776 0.585909402
4624 4776 0.585749061
4740 5058 0.581375697
4740 5061 0.581375697
4754 4776 0.57926166
4720 4727 0.568968537
4675 4776 0.564696563
4723 4738 0.562538792
4729 4781 0.556301257
4724 4776 0.543416956
4755 4799 0.54115842
4725 5136 0.537218737
4735 4757 0.536614566
4732 4757 0.536505529
4730 4738 0.533454088
4725 4767 0.528210755
4722 4724 0.526445545
4720 4738 0.525904226
4740 4768 0.518671711
4757 4799 0.518350289
4648 4776 0.511039604
4729 4733 0.50701591
4674 4731 0.501203959
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4756 4799 0.497610319
4728 4781 0.485025903
4731 4754 0.481534328
4720 4758 0.480277574
4722 4727 0.478834522
4738 4776 0.475490697
4735 5058 0.47256312
4735 5061 0.47256312
4725 4738 0.471162357
4727 4769 0.460486949
4722 4769 0.440729674
4723 4776 0.438702433
4625 4727 0.436991763
4731 4768 0.435095622
4754 4757 0.429822111
4740 4769 0.419377514
4767 4985 0.418819661
4735 4799 0.410340359
4624 4769 0.40973647
4634 4769 0.409674645
4675 4740 0.406075605
4729 4732 0.405319732
4729 4735 0.40517071
4732 4799 0.404024579
4675 4727 0.403435134
4737 5058 0.398261401
4737 5061 0.398261401
4799 4905 0.397445097
4740 4776 0.396758579
4624 4675 0.389291801
4634 4675 0.389106907
4725 4726 0.388179929
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4624 4648 0.383791594
4634 4648 0.38370429
4675 4722 0.379335885
4727 4738 0.379256617
4674 5058 0.376801806
4674 5061 0.376801806
4722 4776 0.375713221
4724 4727 0.368656954
4624 4724 0.367393899
4634 4724 0.367272619
4754 4758 0.364487074
4724 4740 0.357477293
4725 4754 0.355891182
4634 4768 0.354932117
4624 4768 0.354816612
4723 4740 0.354718819
4729 4757 0.354254542
4722 4768 0.350725256
4724 4767 0.348433297
4738 4799 0.346970443
4624 4723 0.341929435
4634 4723 0.341897491
4724 4799 0.335080573
4904 5136 0.330028585
4724 4755 0.328600677
4731 4816 0.327875848
4673 4768 0.319249948
4673 4731 0.318742479
4767 4769 0.316584658
4740 4767 0.312205474
4738 4740 0.307233399
4740 4755 0.306973527
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4634 4738 0.306222568
4624 4738 0.306208951
4738 4767 0.305111329
4905 5136 0.299951574
4735 4904 0.293451913
4732 4904 0.292057652
4724 4754 0.288783481
4727 4768 0.286862081
4767 4776 0.286382165
4723 4727 0.285731524
4768 4799 0.282162242
4624 4740 0.278406559
4634 4740 0.27837981
4674 4768 0.275688857
4755 4769 0.274421718
4675 4755 0.26907988
4723 4767 0.265381982
4673 4767 0.264352061
4738 4755 0.261893313
4735 4905 0.256283517
4732 4905 0.253920625
4727 4776 0.251187169
4625 4737 0.244540292
4731 4769 0.244267171
4726 5136 0.242550042
4648 5136 0.241975637
4720 4816 0.238146218
4723 4755 0.238072918
4625 4728 0.23786407
4727 4755 0.237732018
4722 4725 0.237283795
4673 4776 0.237053045
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4754 4769 0.2341658
4781 4816 0.231305226
4724 4756 0.230107588
4672 4776 0.229785152
4730 4776 0.223063777
4756 4757 0.221984112
4768 4771 0.221164861
4756 4776 0.220286093
4720 4724 0.213272803
4625 4816 0.212777779
4675 4799 0.212360341
4727 4767 0.212220478
4722 4723 0.211299967
4648 4725 0.21036714
4738 4754 0.208861289
4737 4755 0.208693259
4722 4731 0.205654475
4672 4740 0.205028335
4722 4754 0.204697611
4767 4768 0.199416053
4673 4740 0.198377985
4722 4767 0.192268516
4625 4673 0.191945164
4731 4756 0.191243307
4648 4730 0.19107515
4724 4771 0.190758237
4673 4675 0.190397653
4634 4722 0.189408151
4624 4722 0.1892055
4730 4754 0.188982237
4674 4740 0.187800095
4727 4740 0.185993386
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4720 4985 0.181867817
4776 4799 0.18129938
4729 4816 0.180240694
4755 4768 0.179396774
4725 4768 0.177426732
4672 4724 0.176883799
4674 4720 0.176592871
4673 4769 0.175386399
4731 4781 0.175058708
4733 4758 0.174077656
4725 4769 0.173011802
4731 4776 0.172531344
4816 4904 0.170840873
4672 4723 0.169858732
4725 4776 0.168992868
4731 4755 0.165841101
4731 5136 0.16459944
4720 4725 0.15872896
4720 4730 0.158270148
4674 4816 0.156012623
4672 4758 0.154177794
4672 4738 0.153825103
4625 4769 0.151922702
4625 4771 0.151713642
4672 4720 0.151447325
4672 4769 0.149725366
4675 4754 0.149462529
4722 4816 0.14879263
4738 4771 0.147060943
4675 4756 0.146579764
4722 4755 0.144469037
4754 4768 0.144252225
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4674 4776 0.141982225
4740 4799 0.14156647
4625 4731 0.139587468
4816 4905 0.138442573
4738 4756 0.138107399
4648 4767 0.137373739
4730 4768 0.137349338
4674 4675 0.13082937
4727 4771 0.130236186
4673 4730 0.127999458
4673 4720 0.127371488
4673 4758 0.126827749
4672 4675 0.125534797
4673 4725 0.125163313
4731 4757 0.120109142
4724 4725 0.119715155
4673 4755 0.116697946
4730 4816 0.114997345
4672 4722 0.114942782
4722 4740 0.114758278
4733 4756 0.113823225
4625 4720 0.113091119
4674 4755 0.113030891
4723 4725 0.112737494
4722 5136 0.110557041
4781 4985 0.108611071
4720 4776 0.105572013
4625 4674 0.103838077
4731 4985 0.100900241
4756 4769 0.10037523
4672 4768 0.099080219
4799 5136 0.098884008
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4723 4771 0.097416324
4672 4756 0.09268911
4625 4723 0.091132999
4624 4673 0.08766845
4634 4673 0.087601441
4624 4755 0.083938755
4634 4755 0.083642591
4673 4816 0.083199959
4624 4756 0.082302635
4634 4756 0.082181872
4634 4727 0.081487402
4624 4727 0.081392926
4756 4768 0.080045945
4634 5136 0.078095811
4725 4740 0.077922105
4624 5136 0.077823121
4634 4720 0.077260336
4673 4726 0.077194845
4624 4720 0.077111109
4756 4767 0.075926603
4725 4816 0.075752967
4625 4675 0.075561402
4723 4799 0.074263701
4625 4722 0.073948409
4755 4776 0.072081607
4673 4722 0.071080917
4728 4904 0.067931087
4730 4732 0.067604335
4769 4799 0.067590037
4674 4781 0.067268834
4634 4799 0.066902289
4624 4799 0.066901414
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4735 4738 0.065046292
4675 5058 0.064397183
4675 5061 0.064397183
4737 4754 0.062876567
4724 4731 0.062743811
4730 4769 0.062598086
4625 4725 0.061975495
4625 4756 0.06110192
4675 4767 0.059650349
4771 4776 0.057709309
4724 4735 0.057089223
4720 4756 0.054369343
4732 4756 0.053894919
4735 4756 0.053774948
4673 4723 0.052873393
4648 4675 0.050776664
4732 4738 0.050618806
4674 4758 0.049944538
4673 4985 0.049144269
4730 4740 0.0480964
4776 5136 0.04758154
4625 4768 0.046751234
4674 4722 0.046491714
4732 4816 0.046472971
4673 4727 0.044830493
4724 4732 0.043571386
4755 4756 0.042499096
4675 4904 0.042207525
4720 4754 0.041887711
4725 4731 0.041364612
4725 4727 0.040272249
4674 4769 0.039768651
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4735 4816 0.038115917
4728 4905 0.037575802
4816 4985 0.037408681
4673 5136 0.036308163
4723 4816 0.035344024
4769 5058 0.035187061
4769 5061 0.035187061
4648 4673 0.034622704
4720 5136 0.032875416
4737 4816 0.0328664
4672 4905 0.032700653
4672 4904 0.032576405
4625 4738 0.031895708
4648 4769 0.029771686
4771 4799 0.029768887
4723 4729 0.028111981
4674 4767 0.027858724
4673 4732 0.027497784
4673 4735 0.026839222
4731 4738 0.026457596
4674 4732 0.026301875
4674 4735 0.026049042
4674 4985 0.025659864
4728 4816 0.025329008
4729 4740 0.025216066
4731 4740 0.02510296
4720 4740 0.024904441
4675 4735 0.024845105
4723 4756 0.024775524
4738 5136 0.024674366
4672 4755 0.024371931
4757 4767 0.024330061
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4625 4755 0.024322767
4674 4726 0.022100279
4729 4738 0.021959385
4672 4726 0.020893051
4769 5136 0.018011152
4674 4756 0.017950986
4728 4754 0.017893927
4624 4904 0.01781188
4634 4904 0.017769323
4740 4754 0.017745528
4754 4767 0.016643567
4672 4729 0.015416136
4674 4727 0.013990234
4733 4816 0.013861604
4648 4731 0.013461438
4675 4732 0.01307817
4673 4728 0.012699798
4985 5058 0.011252739
4985 5061 0.011252739
4738 4816 0.011103938
4625 4724 0.010713641
4737 4904 0.009243371
4634 4725 0.008822104
4624 4725 0.008497016
4634 4771 0.007938435
4624 4771 0.007632877
4675 4905 0.00754022
4675 4725 0.007202784
4725 4756 0.00691714
4673 4737 0.006272822
4648 4768 0.006020458
4634 4758 0.005880357
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4624 4758 0.005769958
4767 4816 0.005040993
4723 5136 0.004871086
4720 4755 0.004574977
4740 4756 0.003833943
4728 4733 0.003078946
4648 4674 0.002996722
4724 4729 0.00253969
4722 4730 0.002048217
4722 4756 0.002038896
4755 4985 0.001887543
4673 4754 0.001600228
4727 5136 0.001540657
4672 4799 0.000541979
4624 4647 0
4624 4716 0
4624 4734 0
4624 4907 0
4624 4946 0
4624 4948 0
4624 4954 0
4624 5038 0
4624 5059 0
4624 5137 0
4624 5141 0
4625 4647 0
4625 4716 0
4625 4734 0
4625 4907 0
4625 4946 0
4625 4948 0
4625 4954 0
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4625 5038 0
4625 5059 0
4625 5137 0
4625 5141 0
4634 4647 0
4634 4716 0
4634 4734 0
4634 4907 0
4634 4946 0
4634 4948 0
4634 4954 0
4634 5038 0
4634 5059 0
4634 5137 0
4634 5141 0
4647 4648 0
4647 4672 0
4647 4673 0
4647 4674 0
4647 4675 0
4647 4716 0
4647 4720 0
4647 4722 0
4647 4723 0
4647 4724 0
4647 4725 0
4647 4726 0
4647 4727 0
4647 4728 0
4647 4729 0
4647 4730 0
4647 4731 0
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4647 4732 0
4647 4733 0
4647 4734 0
4647 4735 0
4647 4737 0
4647 4738 0
4647 4740 0
4647 4754 0
4647 4755 0
4647 4756 0
4647 4757 0
4647 4758 0
4647 4764 0
4647 4767 0
4647 4768 0
4647 4769 0
4647 4771 0
4647 4776 0
4647 4781 0
4647 4799 0
4647 4816 0
4647 4904 0
4647 4905 0
4647 4907 0
4647 4946 0
4647 4948 0
4647 4954 0
4647 4985 0
4647 5038 0
4647 5058 0
4647 5059 0
4647 5061 0
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4647 5136 0
4647 5137 0
4647 5141 0
4648 4716 0
4648 4734 0
4648 4907 0
4648 4946 0
4648 4948 0
4648 4954 0
4648 5038 0
4648 5059 0
4648 5137 0
4648 5141 0
4672 4716 0
4672 4734 0
4672 4907 0
4672 4946 0
4672 4948 0
4672 4954 0
4672 5038 0
4672 5059 0
4672 5137 0
4672 5141 0
4673 4716 0
4673 4734 0
4673 4907 0
4673 4946 0
4673 4948 0
4673 4954 0
4673 5038 0
4673 5059 0
4673 5137 0
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4673 5141 0
4674 4716 0
4674 4734 0
4674 4907 0
4674 4946 0
4674 4948 0
4674 4954 0
4674 5038 0
4674 5059 0
4674 5137 0
4674 5141 0
4675 4716 0
4675 4734 0
4675 4907 0
4675 4946 0
4675 4948 0
4675 4954 0
4675 5038 0
4675 5059 0
4675 5137 0
4675 5141 0
4716 4720 0
4716 4722 0
4716 4723 0
4716 4724 0
4716 4725 0
4716 4726 0
4716 4727 0
4716 4728 0
4716 4729 0
4716 4730 0
4716 4731 0
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4716 4732 0
4716 4733 0
4716 4734 0
4716 4735 0
4716 4737 0
4716 4738 0
4716 4740 0
4716 4754 0
4716 4755 0
4716 4756 0
4716 4757 0
4716 4758 0
4716 4764 0
4716 4767 0
4716 4768 0
4716 4769 0
4716 4771 0
4716 4776 0
4716 4781 0
4716 4799 0
4716 4816 0
4716 4904 0
4716 4905 0
4716 4907 0
4716 4946 0
4716 4948 0
4716 4954 0
4716 4985 0
4716 5038 0
4716 5058 0
4716 5059 0
4716 5061 0
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4716 5136 0
4716 5137 0
4716 5141 0
4720 4734 0
4720 4764 0
4720 4907 0
4720 4946 0
4720 4948 0
4720 4954 0
4720 5038 0
4720 5059 0
4720 5137 0
4720 5141 0
4722 4734 0
4722 4907 0
4722 4946 0
4722 4948 0
4722 4954 0
4722 5038 0
4722 5059 0
4722 5137 0
4722 5141 0
4723 4734 0
4723 4907 0
4723 4946 0
4723 4948 0
4723 4954 0
4723 5038 0
4723 5059 0
4723 5137 0
4723 5141 0
4724 4734 0
88
Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4724 4907 0
4724 4946 0
4724 4948 0
4724 4954 0
4724 5038 0
4724 5059 0
4724 5137 0
4724 5141 0
4725 4734 0
4725 4907 0
4725 4946 0
4725 4948 0
4725 4954 0
4725 5038 0
4725 5059 0
4725 5137 0
4725 5141 0
4726 4727 0
4726 4734 0
4726 4754 0
4726 4758 0
4726 4764 0
4726 4904 0
4726 4905 0
4726 4907 0
4726 4946 0
4726 4948 0
4726 4954 0
4726 5038 0
4726 5058 0
4726 5059 0
4726 5061 0
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4726 5137 0
4726 5141 0
4727 4734 0
4727 4907 0
4727 4946 0
4727 4948 0
4727 4954 0
4727 5038 0
4727 5059 0
4727 5137 0
4727 5141 0
4728 4734 0
4728 4907 0
4728 4946 0
4728 4948 0
4728 4954 0
4728 5038 0
4728 5059 0
4728 5137 0
4728 5141 0
4729 4734 0
4729 4907 0
4729 4946 0
4729 4948 0
4729 4954 0
4729 5038 0
4729 5059 0
4729 5137 0
4729 5141 0
4730 4731 0
4730 4734 0
4730 4758 0
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4730 4764 0
4730 4767 0
4730 4907 0
4730 4946 0
4730 4948 0
4730 4954 0
4730 5038 0
4730 5058 0
4730 5059 0
4730 5061 0
4730 5137 0
4730 5141 0
4731 4734 0
4731 4764 0
4731 4907 0
4731 4946 0
4731 4948 0
4731 4954 0
4731 5038 0
4731 5058 0
4731 5059 0
4731 5061 0
4731 5137 0
4731 5141 0
4732 4734 0
4732 4764 0
4732 4907 0
4732 4946 0
4732 4948 0
4732 4954 0
4732 5038 0
4732 5059 0
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4732 5137 0
4732 5141 0
4733 4734 0
4733 4764 0
4733 4907 0
4733 4946 0
4733 4948 0
4733 4954 0
4733 5038 0
4733 5059 0
4733 5137 0
4733 5141 0
4734 4735 0
4734 4737 0
4734 4738 0
4734 4740 0
4734 4754 0
4734 4755 0
4734 4756 0
4734 4757 0
4734 4758 0
4734 4764 0
4734 4767 0
4734 4768 0
4734 4769 0
4734 4771 0
4734 4776 0
4734 4781 0
4734 4799 0
4734 4816 0
4734 4904 0
4734 4905 0
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4734 4907 0
4734 4946 0
4734 4948 0
4734 4954 0
4734 4985 0
4734 5038 0
4734 5058 0
4734 5059 0
4734 5061 0
4734 5136 0
4734 5137 0
4734 5141 0
4735 4764 0
4735 4907 0
4735 4946 0
4735 4948 0
4735 4954 0
4735 5038 0
4735 5059 0
4735 5137 0
4735 5141 0
4737 4907 0
4737 4946 0
4737 4948 0
4737 4954 0
4737 5038 0
4737 5059 0
4737 5137 0
4737 5141 0
4738 4907 0
4738 4946 0
4738 4948 0
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4738 4954 0
4738 5038 0
4738 5059 0
4738 5137 0
4738 5141 0
4740 4907 0
4740 4946 0
4740 4948 0
4740 4954 0
4740 5038 0
4740 5059 0
4740 5137 0
4740 5141 0
4754 4907 0
4754 4946 0
4754 4948 0
4754 4954 0
4754 5038 0
4754 5059 0
4754 5137 0
4754 5141 0
4755 4907 0
4755 4946 0
4755 4948 0
4755 4954 0
4755 5038 0
4755 5059 0
4755 5137 0
4755 5141 0
4756 4907 0
4756 4946 0
4756 4948 0
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4756 4954 0
4756 5038 0
4756 5059 0
4756 5137 0
4756 5141 0
4757 4907 0
4757 4946 0
4757 4948 0
4757 4954 0
4757 5038 0
4757 5059 0
4757 5137 0
4757 5141 0
4758 4764 0
4758 4799 0
4758 4904 0
4758 4905 0
4758 4907 0
4758 4946 0
4758 4948 0
4758 4954 0
4758 5038 0
4758 5058 0
4758 5059 0
4758 5061 0
4758 5137 0
4758 5141 0
4764 4781 0
4764 4799 0
4764 4904 0
4764 4905 0
4764 4907 0
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4764 4946 0
4764 4948 0
4764 4954 0
4764 5038 0
4764 5058 0
4764 5059 0
4764 5061 0
4764 5137 0
4764 5141 0
4767 4799 0
4767 4907 0
4767 4946 0
4767 4948 0
4767 4954 0
4767 5038 0
4767 5058 0
4767 5059 0
4767 5061 0
4767 5137 0
4767 5141 0
4768 4907 0
4768 4946 0
4768 4948 0
4768 4954 0
4768 5038 0
4768 5059 0
4768 5137 0
4768 5141 0
4769 4907 0
4769 4946 0
4769 4948 0
4769 4954 0
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4769 5038 0
4769 5059 0
4769 5137 0
4769 5141 0
4771 4907 0
4771 4946 0
4771 4948 0
4771 4954 0
4771 5038 0
4771 5059 0
4771 5137 0
4771 5141 0
4776 4907 0
4776 4946 0
4776 4948 0
4776 4954 0
4776 5038 0
4776 5059 0
4776 5137 0
4776 5141 0
4781 4907 0
4781 4946 0
4781 4948 0
4781 4954 0
4781 5038 0
4781 5058 0
4781 5059 0
4781 5061 0
4781 5137 0
4781 5141 0
4799 4907 0
4799 4946 0
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4799 4948 0
4799 4954 0
4799 5038 0
4799 5059 0
4799 5137 0
4799 5141 0
4816 4907 0
4816 4946 0
4816 4948 0
4816 4954 0
4816 5038 0
4816 5059 0
4816 5137 0
4816 5141 0
4904 4907 0
4904 4946 0
4904 4948 0
4904 4954 0
4904 5038 0
4904 5058 0
4904 5059 0
4904 5061 0
4904 5137 0
4904 5141 0
4905 4907 0
4905 4946 0
4905 4948 0
4905 4954 0
4905 5038 0
4905 5058 0
4905 5059 0
4905 5061 0
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4905 5137 0
4905 5141 0
4907 4946 0
4907 4948 0
4907 4954 0
4907 4985 0
4907 5038 0
4907 5058 0
4907 5059 0
4907 5061 0
4907 5136 0
4907 5137 0
4907 5141 0
4946 4948 0
4946 4954 0
4946 4985 0
4946 5038 0
4946 5058 0
4946 5059 0
4946 5061 0
4946 5136 0
4946 5137 0
4946 5141 0
4948 4954 0
4948 4985 0
4948 5038 0
4948 5058 0
4948 5059 0
4948 5061 0
4948 5136 0
4948 5137 0
4948 5141 0
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4954 4985 0
4954 5038 0
4954 5058 0
4954 5059 0
4954 5061 0
4954 5136 0
4954 5137 0
4954 5141 0
4985 5038 0
4985 5059 0
4985 5137 0
4985 5141 0
5038 5058 0
5038 5059 0
5038 5061 0
5038 5136 0
5038 5137 0
5038 5141 0
5058 5059 0
5058 5137 0
5058 5141 0
5059 5061 0
5059 5136 0
5059 5137 0
5059 5141 0
5061 5137 0
5061 5141 0
5136 5137 0
5136 5141 0
5137 5141 0
4648 4754 -0.001079675
4625 4776 -0.001276717
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4756 4781 -0.002508843
4816 5136 -0.002898104
4648 4727 -0.002971993
4673 4781 -0.002998589
4675 4731 -0.003842919
4624 4905 -0.00406142
4634 4905 -0.004269516
4729 4755 -0.004651017
4674 4730 -0.005026857
4754 5136 -0.005145724
4735 4755 -0.00569882
4674 4725 -0.005934305
4625 4985 -0.006076056
4732 4755 -0.006658528
4673 4756 -0.006705878
4674 4729 -0.008736865
4624 4729 -0.009170715
4720 4728 -0.009382701
4634 4729 -0.009500368
4672 4985 -0.00958047
4728 4730 -0.009596867
4674 5136 -0.01011211
4769 4904 -0.010153682
4674 4728 -0.010239376
4720 4737 -0.011033375
4769 4771 -0.012245137
4648 4723 -0.013580179
4674 4737 -0.01377802
4648 4672 -0.014103033
4737 4756 -0.015225214
4674 4757 -0.018621615
4737 4985 -0.019228705
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4728 4985 -0.019510888
4732 4985 -0.019543479
4673 4729 -0.019913256
4672 5136 -0.020830055
4722 4771 -0.02097266
4985 5136 -0.021404302
4625 4740 -0.022028865
4648 4771 -0.022935374
4723 4754 -0.023165931
4737 4905 -0.023175332
4675 5136 -0.024153555
4799 4985 -0.024635654
4727 4816 -0.024888788
4624 4674 -0.025370416
4634 4674 -0.025379245
4720 4768 -0.025437189
4648 4816 -0.025811036
4729 5136 -0.026731827
4672 4816 -0.027000173
4735 4985 -0.027075954
4674 4799 -0.029367045
4727 4754 -0.029476706
4672 4673 -0.030037493
4722 4904 -0.030913562
4737 4771 -0.031007217
4673 4738 -0.031339631
4723 4735 -0.032194751
4672 4757 -0.032550349
4771 4985 -0.032701214
4672 4771 -0.032951326
4675 4729 -0.033620728
4740 4816 -0.035070872
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4723 4730 -0.035945489
4648 4724 -0.036595785
4723 4732 -0.037541511
4672 4727 -0.03788286
4625 4634 -0.038610706
4624 4625 -0.038668347
4672 4725 -0.039045612
4728 4771 -0.039167757
4675 4985 -0.039268854
4720 4905 -0.039528089
4728 4767 -0.039859306
4769 4905 -0.042611686
4771 4816 -0.043092402
4675 4771 -0.043417937
4757 4985 -0.043858051
4756 4985 -0.04469237
4754 4755 -0.044746332
4625 4672 -0.045769286
4769 4985 -0.046782507
4727 4904 -0.047576188
4720 4904 -0.04846831
4625 5136 -0.048906038
4672 4737 -0.049186414
4648 4738 -0.049324616
4624 4985 -0.050269836
4634 4985 -0.050453
4648 4729 -0.050771616
4729 4768 -0.051197216
4755 5136 -0.05285945
4724 4730 -0.053408141
4672 4728 -0.053703006
4722 4905 -0.053891295
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4729 4985 -0.054236055
4648 4722 -0.054389302
4673 4724 -0.054862519
4768 4985 -0.055239219
4735 4769 -0.055911958
4648 4985 -0.056116271
4754 4781 -0.056130507
4648 4740 -0.056663887
4625 4754 -0.05731357
4722 4985 -0.059105107
4648 4755 -0.060866496
4727 4905 -0.06116558
4776 4816 -0.061542041
4755 4816 -0.061757792
4735 4740 -0.061961354
4674 4723 -0.062355903
4648 4756 -0.062828356
4673 4757 -0.063571144
4722 5058 -0.063757671
4722 5061 -0.063757671
4740 4985 -0.064649405
4724 4985 -0.064748373
4728 4732 -0.065508418
4728 4735 -0.066074283
4732 4737 -0.066955623
4735 4737 -0.067512313
4634 4816 -0.067660885
4624 4816 -0.06769041
4732 4769 -0.067731884
4723 4985 -0.068207495
4771 4904 -0.068484872
4672 4735 -0.068826815
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4672 4732 -0.069415634
4738 4985 -0.069631186
4727 4985 -0.071122425
4757 4771 -0.072075255
4625 4767 -0.072362434
4625 4730 -0.073374347
4732 4740 -0.074502096
4727 4737 -0.075899665
4768 5136 -0.076229142
4725 4905 -0.076768155
4729 4756 -0.078373605
4737 4767 -0.079235122
4725 4771 -0.081139904
4624 4735 -0.081526676
4634 4735 -0.08214159
4771 4905 -0.082261618
4625 4904 -0.08320254
4720 4771 -0.083204943
4727 4728 -0.083718168
4725 4904 -0.084693484
4729 4754 -0.084817523
4720 4767 -0.08483883
4674 4771 -0.087208535
4720 4769 -0.08786717
4722 4737 -0.088615379
4624 4732 -0.088982749
4634 4732 -0.08959418
4648 4720 -0.091731275
4724 4733 -0.091982682
4675 4737 -0.09242516
4724 5136 -0.09242837
4725 4728 -0.095055714
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4733 4737 -0.095159636
4725 4758 -0.095870624
4725 4985 -0.096463422
4725 4737 -0.096654617
4672 4733 -0.097295468
4728 4755 -0.097418911
4722 4728 -0.097820731
4733 4738 -0.097949337
4725 4755 -0.098757191
4733 4985 -0.098933888
4727 4756 -0.0991509
4757 4816 -0.09954508
4756 4904 -0.100542203
4799 4816 -0.100637342
4674 4738 -0.101225891
4733 4755 -0.101585099
4675 4728 -0.104775319
4724 4904 -0.105120926
4735 4768 -0.106901057
4738 4904 -0.10725049
4625 4905 -0.107813204
4648 4735 -0.107832126
4724 4816 -0.108127488
4673 4771 -0.10825955
4732 4767 -0.109612498
4735 4767 -0.110104769
4729 4769 -0.110547319
4737 4740 -0.111066035
4648 4799 -0.111967808
4726 4985 -0.112616686
4776 4904 -0.113671168
4771 5136 -0.114035149
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4675 4720 -0.115009432
4776 4985 -0.115072841
4648 4732 -0.11535845
4674 4724 -0.116254084
4672 4674 -0.117019554
4758 5136 -0.11733403
4768 4816 -0.118712486
4625 4648 -0.118835677
4735 4771 -0.119902092
4737 4769 -0.120872992
4732 4771 -0.122462417
4740 5136 -0.123697738
4728 4740 -0.12398341
4723 4731 -0.124360877
4737 4757 -0.125515506
4723 4737 -0.126898834
4732 4768 -0.127673995
4754 4985 -0.127766818
4769 4816 -0.128775416
4674 4733 -0.128846932
4728 5136 -0.13001122
4755 4757 -0.133066497
4725 4729 -0.133101684
4723 4728 -0.133134734
4675 4816 -0.133282438
4727 4735 -0.133916106
4728 4769 -0.133918967
4624 4757 -0.13469999
4755 4771 -0.134788339
4634 4757 -0.135110969
4730 4985 -0.135130362
4727 4732 -0.135905884
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4673 4905 -0.136586155
4648 4737 -0.136969155
4725 4735 -0.137460476
4737 4799 -0.141588126
4733 4767 -0.143612206
4729 4737 -0.143624065
4624 4737 -0.143976671
4634 4737 -0.144169048
4634 4730 -0.145475586
4625 4732 -0.146017446
4648 4728 -0.146073978
4624 4730 -0.146130946
4738 4905 -0.146144046
4722 4735 -0.146882178
4722 4732 -0.14695087
4724 4905 -0.146959134
4726 4732 -0.147245788
4776 4905 -0.147295332
4754 4771 -0.14790629
4625 4735 -0.148484928
4726 4735 -0.14874405
4729 4758 -0.14887392
4728 4756 -0.149871148
4737 5136 -0.151573571
4756 4905 -0.151616959
4720 4731 -0.153109466
4756 4771 -0.153276405
4728 4729 -0.154765763
4624 4728 -0.155159131
4756 4816 -0.155328613
4634 4728 -0.155355663
4673 4904 -0.1556067
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4755 4781 -0.15769804
4725 4757 -0.158080112
4729 4904 -0.159960737
4729 4776 -0.161118207
4725 4732 -0.163123149
4732 5136 -0.163531194
4735 5136 -0.164433583
4767 5136 -0.166070461
4757 4904 -0.166759727
4624 4733 -0.167272479
4634 4733 -0.168078157
4737 4738 -0.168348764
4728 4758 -0.168763246
4675 4730 -0.172506201
4729 4905 -0.172608072
4724 4737 -0.173626512
4723 4904 -0.174172971
4727 4731 -0.174503157
4726 4781 -0.175118199
4673 5058 -0.17621671
4673 5061 -0.17621671
4674 4905 -0.178361842
4730 4771 -0.179031539
4730 4755 -0.180159004
4737 4781 -0.180738162
4728 4757 -0.181663089
4728 4738 -0.184417367
4722 4799 -0.185937781
4675 4733 -0.186005763
4673 4799 -0.187269785
4738 4757 -0.189876179
4726 4756 -0.190392162
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Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4724 4728 -0.190529973
4725 4733 -0.192509447
4733 4771 -0.193874593
4905 4985 -0.196961339
4674 4904 -0.197355535
4768 4904 -0.198158129
4724 4757 -0.198362867
4731 4771 -0.19914427
4732 4754 -0.199402597
4648 4904 -0.200218341
4740 4904 -0.200742986
4735 4754 -0.201628068
4625 4729 -0.201665897
4720 4735 -0.202293387
4720 4723 -0.202719733
4720 4732 -0.203929601
4722 4729 -0.205092802
4768 5058 -0.205752259
4768 5061 -0.205752259
4740 4771 -0.209701103
4672 4730 -0.210915322
4672 4731 -0.211939308
4740 4905 -0.212136231
4674 4754 -0.216043161
4729 4771 -0.221195273
4726 4755 -0.223445408
4723 4905 -0.22344899
4767 4771 -0.22367134
4624 4767 -0.226088448
4648 4905 -0.226270445
4634 4767 -0.22628406
4723 4733 -0.227962841
110
Table C.1 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4672 4781 -0.229551322
4735 4776 -0.230335699
4733 4754 -0.231929355
4720 4729 -0.23212749
4729 4730 -0.233887914
4720 4757 -0.235737054
4730 4737 -0.236127934
4726 4771 -0.237980436
4758 4776 -0.238991179
4737 4776 -0.240251467
4768 4905 -0.240666025
4756 5136 -0.240847127
4754 4816 -0.242802596
4625 4799 -0.24348849
4730 4757 -0.244579689
4723 4757 -0.252213804
4732 4776 -0.253060111
4737 4768 -0.253597518
4728 4776 -0.257878048
4722 4758 -0.260010834
4673 4733 -0.261549567
4729 4799 -0.261979198
4648 4757 -0.262187264
4733 4740 -0.262419545
4727 4729 -0.26321804
4730 4756 -0.263765521
4757 4905 -0.266175081
4771 4781 -0.267967213
4672 4767 -0.269674777
4731 4732 -0.270294052
4726 4816 -0.270606486
4728 4768 -0.27350865
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4634 4731 -0.273583757
4624 4731 -0.273678684
4675 4757 -0.275188965
4729 4767 -0.279654188
4634 4726 -0.280786574
4624 4726 -0.280998463
4755 4758 -0.281321251
4731 4735 -0.281576021
4904 4985 -0.282140296
4737 4758 -0.284457622
4740 4757 -0.289659845
4720 4799 -0.292504217
4625 4757 -0.29973468
4720 4781 -0.305703991
4733 4769 -0.313286797
4757 4776 -0.321306882
5058 5136 -0.321876114
5061 5136 -0.321876114
4757 4769 -0.322218708
4754 4799 -0.325179072
4731 4767 -0.333333333
4731 4904 -0.333333333
4725 4781 -0.333373213
4727 4757 -0.337458926
4720 4733 -0.337675568
4733 4768 -0.342877813
4726 4733 -0.343182364
4771 5058 -0.345591511
4771 5061 -0.345591511
4757 4768 -0.348627031
4727 4799 -0.349561009
4722 4757 -0.350776449
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4648 4733 -0.352902965
4625 5058 -0.352946969
4625 5061 -0.352946969
4723 5058 -0.354329336
4723 5061 -0.354329336
4755 4904 -0.370735428
4720 4726 -0.375113584
4731 4733 -0.376627088
4727 4781 -0.377900541
4733 5136 -0.392312742
4727 4730 -0.392647635
4624 4781 -0.393220366
4634 4781 -0.393766168
4767 4904 -0.395032854
4767 4905 -0.395032854
4727 4733 -0.404055049
4728 4799 -0.412310451
4740 4781 -0.41500989
4758 4769 -0.417008036
4733 4776 -0.423239748
4755 4905 -0.425426166
4722 4733 -0.4296183
4757 5136 -0.432076724
4733 5058 -0.435455109
4733 5061 -0.435455109
4758 4781 -0.442108287
4740 4758 -0.445363527
4726 4729 -0.447713524
4758 4771 -0.447751512
4738 4758 -0.449774144
4730 4781 -0.457495711
4731 4905 -0.457495711
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4738 4781 -0.464285542
4755 5058 -0.469118224
4755 5061 -0.469118224
4756 5058 -0.470835177
4756 5061 -0.470835177
4757 5058 -0.473400496
4757 5061 -0.473400496
4776 5058 -0.481750636
4776 5061 -0.481750636
4722 4781 -0.486308497
4723 4781 -0.488680691
4724 4758 -0.499884308
4720 5058 -0.5
4720 5061 -0.5
4724 5058 -0.517333977
4724 5061 -0.517333977
4735 4758 -0.518477386
4625 4726 -0.518711301
4726 4740 -0.522342124
4738 5058 -0.546987308
4738 5061 -0.546987308
4625 4733 -0.555024869
4781 5136 -0.56218363
4726 4757 -0.570375421
4758 4767 -0.577350269
4758 4816 -0.58468133
4816 5058 -0.587890754
4816 5061 -0.587890754
4724 4781 -0.591467581
4723 4726 -0.598536416
4732 4758 -0.600200697
4726 4737 -0.60876241
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4725 4799 -0.614660239
4722 4726 -0.619215197
4781 4904 -0.628312119
4781 4905 -0.628312119
4723 4758 -0.668089274
4726 4768 -0.67090959
4675 4758 -0.676866654
4648 5058 -0.682481192
4648 5061 -0.682481192
4625 4758 -0.69913745
4758 4768 -0.699160698
4726 4776 -0.705328872
4648 4726 -0.713356799
4648 4758 -0.714950325
4731 4799 -0.71759845
4726 4769 -0.728217556
4726 4728 -0.7330605
4724 4726 -0.736273119
4727 4758 -0.745367689
4769 4781 -0.74662156
4726 4738 -0.754093571
4781 4799 -0.760330514
4648 4781 -0.775919689
4625 4781 -0.783686157
4776 4781 -0.789688702
4675 4781 -0.857207855
4725 5058 -0.866025404
4725 5061 -0.866025404
4768 4781 -0.872724927
4675 4726 -0.894780258
4624 4764 -1
4625 4764 -1
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4634 4764 -1
4672 4764 -1
4673 4764 -1
4723 4764 -1
4726 4799 -1
4729 4764 -1
4737 4764 -1
4740 4764 -1
4754 4764 -1
4754 5058 -1
4754 5061 -1
4764 4768 -1
4764 4769 -1
4764 4771 -1
4764 4776 -1
4764 4816 -1
4764 4985 -1
4764 5136 -1
4799 5058 -1
4799 5061 -1
C.2 Event Code Correlation Coefficients After Filter
Table C.2 is similar to Table C.1, but applied to the data gathered after
shares and services were filtered out.
Table C.2: EventCode Correlation Coefficients After Filter
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4634 4764 1
4672 4764 1
4674 4716 1
4674 4764 1
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4716 4729 1
4716 4733 1
4716 4735 1
4716 4737 1
4720 4722 1
4720 4735 1
4722 4735 1
4728 4764 1
4731 4738 1
4738 4754 1
4754 4767 1
4755 4764 1
4756 4764 1
4757 4764 1
4764 4767 1
4764 5136 1
4728 4737 0.99991538
4730 4733 0.999814866
4732 4733 0.999800279
4754 4816 0.999792452
4672 4720 0.999669585
4672 4722 0.999669585
4672 4716 0.999368509
4720 4737 0.997256511
4722 4737 0.997256511
4674 4754 0.996114031
4754 5136 0.996078416
4728 4754 0.994659663
4716 4728 0.994367475
4754 4771 0.993307386
4754 4756 0.988632273
4674 4720 0.984498777
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4674 4722 0.984498777
4716 4771 0.980751481
4672 4754 0.980742322
4720 4757 0.976307064
4722 4757 0.976307064
4672 4674 0.973282133
4720 4768 0.970151768
4722 4768 0.970151768
4720 5136 0.965294349
4722 5136 0.965294349
4720 4771 0.962246548
4722 4771 0.962246548
4737 4755 0.959654727
4720 4756 0.952713359
4722 4756 0.952713359
4716 4768 0.952065246
4634 4716 0.945979288
4634 4720 0.94545827
4634 4722 0.94545827
4716 4769 0.926441061
4733 4757 0.924744734
4754 4768 0.924565977
4727 4735 0.924500327
4634 4754 0.923990667
4720 4816 0.912720384
4722 4816 0.912720384
4716 4816 0.908128264
4730 4771 0.904374043
4723 4755 0.898354065
4728 4730 0.850439435
4754 4776 0.822753484
4768 4769 0.798124368
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4716 4776 0.798010118
4724 4738 0.794007962
4720 4776 0.772546201
4722 4776 0.772546201
4727 4781 0.755928946
4754 4769 0.754505825
4768 4776 0.748865583
4674 4768 0.746549547
4723 4738 0.725167484
4720 4769 0.723599049
4722 4769 0.723599049
4634 4776 0.719301731
4672 4768 0.716969552
4729 4755 0.716709457
4732 4754 0.715320239
4735 4755 0.675114776
4769 4776 0.673518014
4724 4735 0.673189067
4716 4732 0.671931944
4768 4771 0.665210343
4732 4757 0.65706034
4728 4755 0.637378891
4720 4781 0.628618557
4722 4781 0.628618557
4731 5136 0.625
4672 4724 0.615454059
4729 4733 0.614683899
4767 4781 0.610541276
4674 4724 0.603298232
4672 4771 0.602309793
4674 4771 0.593954906
4756 4781 0.588974951
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4720 4724 0.577350269
4722 4724 0.577350269
4728 4733 0.572567834
4771 5136 0.571036481
4727 4733 0.568903075
4720 4729 0.567613479
4722 4729 0.567613479
4674 4738 0.559464108
4727 5136 0.541130832
4674 4816 0.525925683
4729 4732 0.517616176
4757 4781 0.517600674
4672 4738 0.513587189
4738 4755 0.501628099
4672 4816 0.497594154
4729 4757 0.486512253
4738 5136 0.465387145
4771 4776 0.462366355
4776 5136 0.458087917
4768 5136 0.457995984
4733 4738 0.457832441
4634 4768 0.456813639
4738 4781 0.452858923
4674 4776 0.434463771
4724 4729 0.420897867
4672 4776 0.419657944
4634 4672 0.410811148
4634 4674 0.403010956
4634 4769 0.394809084
4634 5136 0.393272992
4738 4767 0.390199486
4769 5136 0.388873893
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4720 4728 0.388378667
4722 4728 0.388378667
4727 4732 0.385462897
4769 4771 0.373789748
4732 4738 0.371963127
4674 4769 0.364572774
4723 4735 0.358568583
4729 4816 0.358050833
4738 4757 0.35207576
4735 4738 0.349506319
4737 4781 0.34661018
4733 4816 0.340040676
4672 4769 0.339885473
4738 4768 0.333966889
4724 4767 0.333333333
4724 4757 0.332542985
4724 4737 0.329345691
4674 4729 0.328162648
4634 4771 0.325764459
4672 5136 0.324121768
4781 5136 0.322056595
4674 5136 0.310658974
4723 5136 0.305041064
4756 5136 0.302383182
4729 4731 0.29743804
4672 4729 0.295015934
4767 5136 0.281966908
4723 4737 0.281204282
4767 4769 0.277355625
4727 4737 0.252318084
4728 4757 0.249608869
4727 4755 0.247770372
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4756 4757 0.24180747
4737 4738 0.237941291
4768 4816 0.237445011
4732 4816 0.236901115
4767 4776 0.220502773
4729 4768 0.219766677
4729 4735 0.218984606
4672 4735 0.214240145
4738 4771 0.210097103
4738 4756 0.207596079
4674 4733 0.199665595
4672 4733 0.199532652
4724 4781 0.193649167
4727 4816 0.189652562
4674 4732 0.188772925
4724 4771 0.188735231
4733 4756 0.18686247
4735 4781 0.18267282
4756 4776 0.179872172
4674 4735 0.176777412
4634 4767 0.172298989
4672 4732 0.164290693
4727 4728 0.161271082
4723 4781 0.158113883
4674 4757 0.157107393
4723 4771 0.155290766
4735 4816 0.154788252
4738 4769 0.15232293
4634 4738 0.149478033
4757 4816 0.149185502
4771 4816 0.148191705
4728 4738 0.135515014
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4724 4816 0.13442604
4738 4776 0.133709564
4674 4723 0.133031205
4720 4738 0.132453236
4722 4738 0.132453236
4776 4781 0.129479927
4634 4729 0.128003552
4735 4768 0.121393096
4756 4768 0.119033855
4634 4816 0.11677128
4724 4756 0.115051684
4724 5136 0.110611529
4735 4756 0.110606134
4756 4769 0.107114859
4723 4768 0.099870837
4728 4781 0.092701539
4674 4756 0.090742175
4767 4768 0.09061182
4729 4781 0.088321724
4634 4756 0.086226127
4672 4757 0.083431263
4735 4771 0.080668316
4776 4816 0.078658579
4728 4767 0.078607856
4735 4776 0.078224206
4672 4756 0.078071457
4732 4756 0.072829785
4674 4767 0.072604419
4723 4728 0.067644287
4723 4729 0.06718098
4767 4816 0.064718378
4757 4767 0.0564968
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4634 4781 0.055851229
4729 4776 0.052640868
4728 4756 0.051928361
4674 4781 0.051328091
4755 4816 0.051313125
4732 4768 0.04981891
4723 4776 0.049800478
4634 4723 0.049519775
4755 4757 0.045740656
4737 4816 0.045102809
4634 4735 0.044246572
4735 4757 0.043525367
4729 4771 0.041754643
4769 4781 0.040272534
4737 4756 0.037956556
4731 4735 0.035245369
4728 5136 0.034569289
4724 4768 0.032374504
4768 4781 0.030911461
4767 4771 0.029018724
4733 4755 0.028085501
4732 4781 0.027344141
4737 4757 0.022820466
4729 4738 0.020465575
4735 5136 0.019588524
4672 4781 0.018050587
4672 4727 0.012946885
4769 4816 0.011527089
4756 4816 0.011469622
4756 4767 0.007763285
4634 4725 0
4634 4734 0
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4634 4758 0
4634 4946 0
4634 4948 0
4634 4954 0
4634 4985 0
4634 5058 0
4634 5059 0
4634 5061 0
4672 4725 0
4672 4734 0
4672 4758 0
4672 4946 0
4672 4948 0
4672 4954 0
4672 4985 0
4672 5058 0
4672 5059 0
4672 5061 0
4674 4725 0
4674 4730 0
4674 4734 0
4674 4758 0
4674 4946 0
4674 4948 0
4674 4954 0
4674 4985 0
4674 5058 0
4674 5059 0
4674 5061 0
4716 4720 0
4716 4722 0
4716 4723 0
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4716 4724 0
4716 4725 0
4716 4727 0
4716 4730 0
4716 4731 0
4716 4734 0
4716 4738 0
4716 4754 0
4716 4758 0
4716 4764 0
4716 4767 0
4716 4781 0
4716 4946 0
4716 4948 0
4716 4954 0
4716 4985 0
4716 5058 0
4716 5059 0
4716 5061 0
4720 4723 0
4720 4725 0
4720 4727 0
4720 4730 0
4720 4731 0
4720 4733 0
4720 4734 0
4720 4754 0
4720 4758 0
4720 4764 0
4720 4946 0
4720 4948 0
4720 4954 0
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4720 4985 0
4720 5058 0
4720 5059 0
4720 5061 0
4722 4723 0
4722 4725 0
4722 4727 0
4722 4730 0
4722 4731 0
4722 4733 0
4722 4734 0
4722 4754 0
4722 4758 0
4722 4764 0
4722 4946 0
4722 4948 0
4722 4954 0
4722 4985 0
4722 5058 0
4722 5059 0
4722 5061 0
4723 4725 0
4723 4727 0
4723 4730 0
4723 4731 0
4723 4734 0
4723 4754 0
4723 4758 0
4723 4764 0
4723 4767 0
4723 4946 0
4723 4948 0
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4723 4954 0
4723 4985 0
4723 5058 0
4723 5059 0
4723 5061 0
4724 4725 0
4724 4727 0
4724 4728 0
4724 4730 0
4724 4731 0
4724 4734 0
4724 4754 0
4724 4758 0
4724 4764 0
4724 4946 0
4724 4948 0
4724 4954 0
4724 4985 0
4724 5058 0
4724 5059 0
4724 5061 0
4725 4727 0
4725 4728 0
4725 4729 0
4725 4730 0
4725 4731 0
4725 4732 0
4725 4733 0
4725 4734 0
4725 4735 0
4725 4737 0
4725 4738 0
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4725 4754 0
4725 4755 0
4725 4756 0
4725 4757 0
4725 4758 0
4725 4764 0
4725 4767 0
4725 4768 0
4725 4769 0
4725 4771 0
4725 4776 0
4725 4781 0
4725 4816 0
4725 4946 0
4725 4948 0
4725 4954 0
4725 4985 0
4725 5058 0
4725 5059 0
4725 5061 0
4725 5136 0
4727 4730 0
4727 4731 0
4727 4734 0
4727 4738 0
4727 4754 0
4727 4758 0
4727 4764 0
4727 4767 0
4727 4946 0
4727 4948 0
4727 4954 0
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4727 4985 0
4727 5058 0
4727 5059 0
4727 5061 0
4728 4734 0
4728 4758 0
4728 4946 0
4728 4948 0
4728 4954 0
4728 4985 0
4728 5058 0
4728 5059 0
4728 5061 0
4729 4734 0
4729 4758 0
4729 4946 0
4729 4948 0
4729 4954 0
4729 4985 0
4729 5058 0
4729 5059 0
4729 5061 0
4730 4731 0
4730 4734 0
4730 4735 0
4730 4738 0
4730 4754 0
4730 4758 0
4730 4764 0
4730 4767 0
4730 4781 0
4730 4946 0
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EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4730 4948 0
4730 4954 0
4730 4985 0
4730 5058 0
4730 5059 0
4730 5061 0
4731 4734 0
4731 4754 0
4731 4755 0
4731 4758 0
4731 4764 0
4731 4767 0
4731 4946 0
4731 4948 0
4731 4954 0
4731 4985 0
4731 5058 0
4731 5059 0
4731 5061 0
4732 4734 0
4732 4758 0
4732 4764 0
4732 4946 0
4732 4948 0
4732 4954 0
4732 4985 0
4732 5058 0
4732 5059 0
4732 5061 0
4733 4734 0
4733 4758 0
4733 4764 0
131
Table C.2 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4733 4946 0
4733 4948 0
4733 4954 0
4733 4985 0
4733 5058 0
4733 5059 0
4733 5061 0
4734 4735 0
4734 4737 0
4734 4738 0
4734 4754 0
4734 4755 0
4734 4756 0
4734 4757 0
4734 4758 0
4734 4764 0
4734 4767 0
4734 4768 0
4734 4769 0
4734 4771 0
4734 4776 0
4734 4781 0
4734 4816 0
4734 4946 0
4734 4948 0
4734 4954 0
4734 4985 0
4734 5058 0
4734 5059 0
4734 5061 0
4734 5136 0
4735 4758 0
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Table C.2 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4735 4764 0
4735 4946 0
4735 4948 0
4735 4954 0
4735 4985 0
4735 5058 0
4735 5059 0
4735 5061 0
4737 4754 0
4737 4758 0
4737 4764 0
4737 4946 0
4737 4948 0
4737 4954 0
4737 4985 0
4737 5058 0
4737 5059 0
4737 5061 0
4738 4758 0
4738 4764 0
4738 4946 0
4738 4948 0
4738 4954 0
4738 4985 0
4738 5058 0
4738 5059 0
4738 5061 0
4754 4758 0
4754 4764 0
4754 4946 0
4754 4948 0
4754 4954 0
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Table C.2 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4754 4985 0
4754 5058 0
4754 5059 0
4754 5061 0
4755 4758 0
4755 4946 0
4755 4948 0
4755 4954 0
4755 4985 0
4755 5058 0
4755 5059 0
4755 5061 0
4756 4758 0
4756 4946 0
4756 4948 0
4756 4954 0
4756 4985 0
4756 5058 0
4756 5059 0
4756 5061 0
4757 4758 0
4757 4946 0
4757 4948 0
4757 4954 0
4757 4985 0
4757 5058 0
4757 5059 0
4757 5061 0
4758 4764 0
4758 4767 0
4758 4768 0
4758 4769 0
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Table C.2 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4758 4771 0
4758 4776 0
4758 4781 0
4758 4816 0
4758 4946 0
4758 4948 0
4758 4954 0
4758 4985 0
4758 5058 0
4758 5059 0
4758 5061 0
4758 5136 0
4764 4781 0
4764 4946 0
4764 4948 0
4764 4954 0
4764 4985 0
4764 5058 0
4764 5059 0
4764 5061 0
4767 4946 0
4767 4948 0
4767 4954 0
4767 4985 0
4767 5058 0
4767 5059 0
4767 5061 0
4768 4946 0
4768 4948 0
4768 4954 0
4768 4985 0
4768 5058 0
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Table C.2 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4768 5059 0
4768 5061 0
4769 4946 0
4769 4948 0
4769 4954 0
4769 4985 0
4769 5058 0
4769 5059 0
4769 5061 0
4771 4946 0
4771 4948 0
4771 4954 0
4771 4985 0
4771 5058 0
4771 5059 0
4771 5061 0
4776 4946 0
4776 4948 0
4776 4954 0
4776 4985 0
4776 5058 0
4776 5059 0
4776 5061 0
4781 4946 0
4781 4948 0
4781 4954 0
4781 4985 0
4781 5058 0
4781 5059 0
4781 5061 0
4816 4946 0
4816 4948 0
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Table C.2 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4816 4954 0
4816 4985 0
4816 5058 0
4816 5059 0
4816 5061 0
4946 4948 0
4946 4954 0
4946 4985 0
4946 5058 0
4946 5059 0
4946 5061 0
4946 5136 0
4948 4954 0
4948 4985 0
4948 5058 0
4948 5059 0
4948 5061 0
4948 5136 0
4954 4985 0
4954 5058 0
4954 5059 0
4954 5061 0
4954 5136 0
4985 5058 0
4985 5059 0
4985 5061 0
4985 5136 0
5058 5059 0
5058 5061 0
5058 5136 0
5059 5061 0
5059 5136 0
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Table C.2 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
5061 5136 0
4672 4767 -6.92E-05
4729 4769 -0.00051772
4732 4735 -0.002926929
4728 4816 -0.003172485
4672 4723 -0.004261153
4723 4756 -0.004742711
4732 4771 -0.007342178
4729 4756 -0.008285018
4737 4767 -0.010414711
4733 4771 -0.013285454
4674 4727 -0.015792713
4738 4816 -0.019620252
4672 4728 -0.023930936
4727 4771 -0.02433118
4733 4768 -0.024537612
4737 5136 -0.024591159
4731 4771 -0.026804283
4728 4731 -0.030923453
4731 4816 -0.031598603
4720 4732 -0.031958098
4722 4732 -0.031958098
4816 5136 -0.032066736
4727 4768 -0.036128737
4733 4735 -0.037268493
4781 4816 -0.040775056
4732 4769 -0.040795051
4723 4769 -0.046222826
4735 4767 -0.048029211
4732 4755 -0.049344031
4757 4771 -0.053686582
4728 4732 -0.056911085
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Table C.2 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4728 4771 -0.062511485
4756 4771 -0.06281842
4755 4781 -0.06559696
4755 4771 -0.067789129
4674 4728 -0.072608634
4723 4757 -0.07823312
4634 4732 -0.079349059
4672 4755 -0.080133212
4755 4756 -0.081617862
4674 4755 -0.084774968
4672 4737 -0.086653166
4757 4768 -0.091415285
4732 4737 -0.105056116
4732 5136 -0.107682728
4634 4755 -0.10948934
4724 4732 -0.113750144
4755 5136 -0.113763651
4737 4771 -0.125762699
4755 4768 -0.129147544
4727 4776 -0.129907821
4757 5136 -0.132304664
4728 4769 -0.132320094
4729 5136 -0.132539037
4731 4768 -0.133806035
4723 4732 -0.135449778
4771 4781 -0.140056487
4723 4733 -0.142423665
4728 4735 -0.142448373
4674 4737 -0.143066275
4732 4776 -0.15186712
4634 4733 -0.153997495
4672 4730 -0.162757692
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Table C.2 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4727 4756 -0.164123749
4731 4737 -0.174108878
4728 4729 -0.175823119
4729 4737 -0.17641269
4735 4769 -0.177149643
4634 4728 -0.178278343
4728 4768 -0.181461759
4634 4757 -0.191203382
4674 4731 -0.196132354
4724 4733 -0.199217417
4634 4727 -0.209656875
4733 4769 -0.213068018
4723 4816 -0.213991481
4732 4767 -0.221028637
4735 4737 -0.224620443
4757 4776 -0.225548801
4733 4781 -0.227988481
4634 4731 -0.229519362
4733 4737 -0.234186196
4728 4776 -0.236024055
4727 4729 -0.242350939
4733 4776 -0.245656276
4733 5136 -0.250903914
4757 4769 -0.252887124
4755 4776 -0.253698007
4672 4731 -0.257975591
4731 4776 -0.266370813
4755 4769 -0.271725828
4729 4767 -0.273680212
4733 4767 -0.283493895
4755 4767 -0.303583612
4727 4769 -0.311962751
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Table C.2 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4731 4732 -0.314696137
4724 4755 -0.353392543
4727 4757 -0.353953174
4720 4755 -0.381246426
4722 4755 -0.381246426
4730 4816 -0.38765486
4737 4768 -0.39325503
4730 4737 -0.397359707
4731 4756 -0.402846499
4737 4769 -0.40310898
4731 4733 -0.404860098
4634 4724 -0.422541184
4731 4757 -0.42291027
4634 4737 -0.428515337
4724 4776 -0.431873876
4754 4755 -0.445424897
4735 4754 -0.459781196
4730 5136 -0.461083968
4737 4776 -0.482320689
4723 4724 -0.5
4724 4769 -0.532677263
4731 4781 -0.555555556
4730 4755 -0.654653671
4730 4757 -0.654653671
4730 4768 -0.7059679
4731 4769 -0.753083696
4730 4776 -0.761900692
4729 4730 -0.917662935
4730 4732 -0.933256525
4730 4756 -0.933256525
4634 4730 -0.944726543
4730 4769 -0.99986289
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Table C.2 Continued
EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4716 4755 -1
4716 4756 -1
4716 4757 -1
4716 5136 -1
4720 4767 -1
4722 4767 -1
4729 4754 -1
4729 4764 -1
4733 4754 -1
4754 4757 -1
4754 4781 -1
4764 4768 -1
4764 4769 -1
4764 4771 -1
4764 4776 -1
4764 4816 -1
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